This study uniquely addresses declining business profitability because of a lack of coordinated meetings between the public and private sectors. We determine optimal meeting frequency (i.e., the highest number of regularly scheduled meetings of the Standing Committee of the inter-agency coordination per year at which profit can be maximised) for poorly functioning public-private partnership (PPP) industries (i.e., their average return on assets or ROA < 0). The tourism industry in emerging countries such as Laos provides an example of a PPP. Using two-person Nash bargaining theory and given budget constraints, we find that the government should conduct bimonthly meetings to improve PPP industry competitiveness. We believe that our study makes a significant contribution to the literature because few emerging studies use mathematical models to address the problem of public and private sector meeting frequency and collaboration. ARTICLE HISTORY

To acquire an information regarding the best travel destination, there are two main sources which can be used: advertising (books and magazines, TV, radio, and travel agencies) and word-of-mouth recommendations (WOM) via the Internet and friends. This study employed two research questions. First, how does advertising influence WOM, and vice versa. Second, to tackle the unsolved problem regarding how to predict traveler demand using WOM that can help improving tourism competitiveness. By using static demand and quadratic cost function, the authors found that advertising generates optimal outcome in tourism industry rather than WOM. Although the player's (the tourism industry in a country) net profit tends to have a positive effect on optimal advertising investment, it is the opposite case if WOM is used. WOM can be detrimental to an agent's advertising campaigns, and may create disadvantage on tourism competition.

This study develops the link between output and fiscal corruption risk in public-private partnership (PPP) schemes and the government bailout rate of non-performing loans (NPLs). The model assumes that corruption is widespread in such public investment programs. The objective functions of the government and PPP firms include fiscal corruption risk, given that the PPP firm and tax inspector can 'effectively' negotiate bribes. The model solves for the optimal country output (i.e., aggregate productivity) according to the Lagrange method. Long-term prospects are introduced to solve the problem with commercial banks, as most PPPs borrow from commercial banks. The results reaffirm that tax policy can exacerbate the country's output loss. Although the equilibria between aggregate productivity and the Laffer curve lack a direct link to fiscal corruption risk, their magnitude does and depends on the number of PPPs. The PPP transfer from the government in period 2 and the number of PPPs rather than government expenditure in period 1 and the Laffer curve (tax revenues) mainly determines the bailout rate of PPPs' NPLs. The article concludes with suggestions to prevent tax evasion and fiscal corruption risk in PPP schemes by using a cluster of cooperation, and recommends further research into cultural aspects.

This study focuses on compensation issues in Luang Namtha province (player LNT), Laos, where the laissez faire compensation seems widely inapplicable. Solving the problem of an eco-cultural Park, a public-private partnership investment project that has been delaying since 2011, we argue, lies in readjusting the bargaining power between affected households and player LNT backed by the project investor. However, in the de facto household's perspective, the game is merely a Chicken game, which is described by player LNT's harsh penalty based on Ultimatum or Dictatorship game that appears not be prescribed strictly. We find to enhance the ex-ante sustainability of the compensation the autocratic/unautocratic style of the provincial leadership and the household's bargaining power can be key. Specifically, the project investor should contribute to the compensation payment based on the leadership style and the household's bargaining power rather than player LNT's monetary penalty system. Lastly, we discuss the household's expected payoff based on random leadership style.