As the ESG finance field and the use of ESG data in investment decision‐making continue to grow, the authors seek to shed light on several important aspects of ESG measurement and data. This article is intended to provide a useful guide for the rapidly rising number of people entering the field. The authors focus on the following: The sheer variety, and inconsistency, of the data and measures, and of how companies report them. Listing more than 20 different ways companies report their employee health and safety data, the authors show how such inconsistencies lead to significantly different results when looking at the same group of companies. ‘Benchmarking,’ or how data providers define companies' peer groups, can be crucial in determining the performance ranking of a company. The lack of transparency among data providers about peer group components and observed ranges for ESG metrics creates market‐wide inconsistencies and undermines their reliability. The differences in the imputation methods used by ESG researchers and analysts to deal with vast ‘data gaps’ that span ranges of companies and time periods for different ESG metrics can cause large ‘disagreements’ among the providers, with different gap‐filling approaches leading to big discrepancies. The disagreements among ESG data providers are not only large, but actually increase with the quantity of publicly available information. Citing a recent study showing that companies that provide more ESG disclosure tend to have more variation in their ESG ratings, the authors interpret this finding as clear evidence of the need for ‘a clearer understanding of what different ESG metrics might tell us and how they might best be institutionalized for assessing corporate performance.’ What can be done to address these problems with ESG data? Companies should ‘take control of the ESG data narrative’ by proactively shaping disclosure instead of being overwhelmed by survey requests. To that end, companies should ‘customize’ their metrics to some extent, while at the same time seeking to self‐regulate by reaching agreement with industry peers on a ‘reasonable baseline’ of standardized ESG metrics designed to achieve comparability. Investors are urged to push for more meaningful ESG disclosure by narrowing the demand for ESG data into somewhat more standardized, but still manageable metrics. Stock exchanges should consider issuing—and perhaps even mandating—guidelines for ESG disclosures designed in collaboration with companies, investors, and regulators. And data providers should come to agreement on best practices and become as transparent as possible about their methodologies and the reliability of their data.

The number of public companies reporting ESG information grew from fewer than 20 in the early 1990s to 8,500 by 2014. Moreover, by the end of 2014, over 1,400 institutional investors that manage some $60 trillion in assets had signed the UN Principles for Responsible Investment (UNPRI). Nevertheless, companies with high ESG “scores” have continued to be viewed by mainstream investors as unlikely to produce competitive shareholder returns, in part because of the findings of older studies showing low returns from the social responsibility investing of the 1990s. But studies of more recent periods suggest that companies with significant ESG programs have actually outperformed their competitors in a number of important ways.The authors’ aim in this article is to set the record straight on the financial performance of sustainable investing while also correcting a number of other widespread misconceptions about this rapidly growing set of principles and methods:Myth Number 1: ESG programs reduce returns on capital and long‐run shareholder value.Reality: Companies committed to ESG are finding competitive advantages in product, labor, and capital markets; and portfolios that have integrated “material” ESG metrics have provided average returns to their investors that are superior to those of conventional portfolios, while exhibiting lower risk.Myth Number 2: ESG is already well integrated into mainstream investment management.Reality: The UNPRI signatories have committed themselves only to adhering to a set of principles for responsible investment, a standard that falls well short of integrating ESG considerations into their investment decisions.Myth Number 3: Companies cannot influence the kind of shareholders who buy their shares, and corporate managers must often sacrifice sustainability goals to meet the quarterly earnings targets of increasingly short‐term‐oriented investors.Reality: Companies that pursue major sustainability initiatives, and publicize them in integrated reports and other communications with investors, have also generally succeeded in attracting disproportionate numbers of longer‐term shareholders.Myth Number 4: ESG data for fundamental analysis is scarce and unreliable.Reality: Thanks to the efforts of reporting and investor organizations such as SASB and Ceres, and of CDP data providers like Bloomberg and MSCI, much more “value‐relevant” ESG data on companies has become available in the past ten years.Myth Number 5: ESG adds value almost entirely by limiting risks.Reality: Along with lower risk and a lower cost of capital, companies with high ESG scores have also experienced increases in operating efficiency and expansions into new markets.Myth Number 6: Consideration of ESG factors might create a conflict with fiduciary duty for some investors.Reality: Many ESG factors have been shown to have positive correlations with corporate financial performance and value, prompting ERISA in 2015 to reverse its earlier instructions to pension funds about the legitimacy of taking account of “non‐financial” considerations when investing in companies.

On page 3 of the originally published article, in the sentence "Extracting an activation energy from the measurements in the δ phase gives a value of 0.2 eV, however due to the small temperature range over which these are performed this value may have significant errors", the value of 0.2 eV is incorrect and should read 0.7 eV. This error has no implications for the results presented in the article. The authors apologize for any inconvenience this error may have caused.

The authors summarize the findings of their event study of the capital market reactions to an inaugural set of 17 CEO presentations of their ‘long‐term plans’ to institutional investors. The findings show that, although sell‐side analysts appear unresponsive to such plans, both trading volumes and stock prices exhibit significant abnormal reactions to the presentations, providing suggestive evidence that the communication of such plans conveys ‘value‐relevant’ information to investors with longer time horizons. Although based on an admittedly small sample, these findings shed light on the promise of long‐term plans and have been corroborated by analysis of the market response to the presentations of 10 more companies since the study was conducted. The authors also provide the outlines of a ‘content framework’ designed to help companies put together effective corporate plans and other long‐term disclosures. The framework is organized around nine main ‘themes,’ including policies governing capital allocation, corporate governance, and human capital development, as well as the statement of corporate purpose. After applying this framework to the 17 CEO presentations, the authors find that the more specific and forward‐looking the information disclosed in these long‐term plans, the more positive the capital market reaction.

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