Due to their reliance on constitutive higher-order representing to generate the qualities of which the subject is consciously aware, I argue that the major existing higher-order representational theories of consciousness insulate us from our first-order sensory states. In fact on these views we are never properly conscious of our sensory states at all. In their place I offer a new higher-order theory of consciousness, with a view to making us suitably intimate with our sensory states in experience. This theory relies on the idea of 'quoting' sensory qualities, so is dubbed the 'quotational higher-order thought theory'. I argue that it can capture something of the idea that we are 'acquainted' with our conscious states without slipping beyond the pale for naturalists, whilst also providing satisfying treatments of traditional problems for higher-order theories concerning representational mismatch. The theory achieves this by abandoning a representational mechanism for mental intentionality, in favour of one based on 'embedding'.Keywords Consciousness Á Higher-order thought Á Qualia Á Representation Á Self-representation Á Acquaintance For those who believe consciousness requires higher-order cognitive access to a mental state, 1 two major questions concern, respectively, the relationship between the accessing and accessed vehicles, and that between the accessing and accessed S. Coleman (&) Department of Philosophy, University of Hertfordshire, de Havilland Campus, Hatfield, Hertfordshire AL10 9AB, UK e-mail: S.Coleman@herts.ac.uk 1 Cf. Gennaro (2012: 282). This mental operation on a mental state distinguishes 'higher-order' theories of consciousness from 'first-order' ones (Tye 2000; Dretske 1995) where a mental state is conscious due to its functional role, e.g. being poised to impact beliefs and desires.
123PhilosStud (2015) 172:2705-2733 DOI 10.1007/s11098-015-0441-1
contents.2 Concerning the vehicles, especially interesting is the question how tightly bound the accessed state is with the accessing state. Is the accessed mental state wholly distinct from the accessing mental state, wholly identical to it, or somewhere in between (and if the latter, where exactly in between)? Concerning the contents, especially interesting is the question whether the accessing or accessed content dominates in fixing what the subject finds in consciousness.The literature on higher-order approaches to consciousness features a superficial variety of positions on the vehicle issue, and an unacknowledged consensus on the content issue. This paper adopts novel positions on both issues, yielding a new higher-order theory of consciousness. Our dialectic springs from the problem of mistargeted representations. We see how this problem has generated consensus on the content issue, how this consensus makes the variety of responses to the vehicle issue superficial, and how this convergence is evitable by a different treatment of the difficulty. This leads to a higherorder theory whose distinctive feature, as well as dealing neatly ...
