BackgroundMany LMICs have implemented Publicly Funded Health Insurance (PFHI) programmes to improve access and financial protection. The national PFHI scheme implemented in India for a decade has been recently modified and expanded to cover free hospital care for 500 million persons. Since increase in annual cover amount is one of the main design modifications in the new programme, the relevant policy question is whether such design change can improve financial protection for hospital care. An evaluation of state-specific PFHI programmes with vertical cover larger than RSBY can help answer this question.Three states in Southern India - Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka and Tamil Nadu have been pioneers in implementing PFHI with a large insurance cover.MethodsThe current study was meant to evaluate the PFHI in above three states in improving utilisation of hospital services and financial protection against expenses of hospitalization. Two cross-sections from National Sample Survey’s health rounds, the 60th round done in 2004 and the 71st round done in 2014 were analysed. Instrumental Variable method was applied to address endogeneity or the selection problem in insurance.ResultsEnrollment under PFHI was not associated with increase in utilisation of hospital care in the three states. Private hospitals dominated the empanelment of facilities under PFHI as well as utilisation. Out of Pocket Expenditure and incidence of Catastrophic Health Expenditure did not decrease with enrollment under PFHI in the three states. The size of Out of Pocket Expenditure was significantly greater for utilisation in private sector, irrespective of insurance enrollment.ConclusionPFHI in the three states used substantially larger vertical cover than national scheme in 2014. The three states are known for their good governance. Yet, the PFHI programmes in all three states failed in fulfilling their fundamental purpose. Increasing vertical cover of PFHI and using either ‘Trusts’ or Insurance-companies as purchasers may not give desired results in absence of adequate regulation. The study raises doubts regarding effectiveness of contracting under PFHIs to influence provider-behavior in the Indian context. Further research is required to find solutions for addressing gaps that contribute to poor financial outcomes for patients under PFHI.

Background: A national Publicly Funded Health Insurance (PFHI) scheme called Pradhan Mantri Jan Arogaya Yojana (PMJAY) was launched by government of India in 2018. PMJAY seeks to cover 500 million persons with an annual cover of around 7000 USD per household. PMJAY claims to be the largest government funded health scheme globally and has attracted an international debate as a policy for Universal Health Coverage. India's decade-long experience of the earlier national and state-specific PFHI schemes had shown poor effectiveness in financial protection. Most states in India have completed a year of implementation of PMJAY but no evaluations are available of this important scheme. Methods: The study was designed to find out the effect of enrolment under PMJAY in improving utilisation of hospital services and financial protection in Chhattisgarh which has been a leading state in implementing PFHI in terms of enrolment and claims. The study analyses three repeated cross-sections. Two of the cross-sections are from National Sample Survey (NSS) health roundsyear 2004 when there was no PFHI and 2014 when the older PFHI scheme was in operation. Primary data was collected in 2019-end to cover the first year of PMJAY implementation and it formed the third cross-section. Multivariate analysis was carried out. In addition, Propensity Score Matching and Instrumental Variable method were applied to address the selection problem in insurance. Results: Enrollment under PMJAY or other PFHI schemes did not increase utilisation of hospital-care in Chhattisgarh. Out of Pocket Expenditure (OOPE) and incidence of Catastrophic Health Expenditure did not decrease with enrollment under PMJAY or other PFHI schemes. The size of OOPE was significantly greater for utilisation in private sector, irrespective of enrollment under PMJAY.

The Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana (RSBY) scheme is a health insurance model currently being implemented by the Indian government. It is a model, however, still in nascent state, subject to tensions and value testing. Very few studies have hitherto assessed the scheme's implementation and whether the stated objectives of the government initiative are being fulfilled. This short study undertaken in the Durg district of Chhattisgarh reveals that RSBY fails to cover the population living Below the Poverty Line (BPL). Likewise there is discrepancy in the consistency of information and knowledge regarding the scheme among the beneficiaries who are themselves continuing to incur high out-of-pocket expenses.There are thus severe issues in transparency and accountability within the RSBY scheme. Unless the public health delivery system is strengthened and the private sector regulated and indeed monitored, the scheme will not yield the desired results, and the cost of healthcare will further escalate for the poor. In the absence of regulated health services there needs to be more debate, and indeed greater research, on the implementation and the design of RSBY.

Objective The COVID-19 pandemic has caused widespread illness and a significant proportion of the infected required hospitalisation for treatment. People in developing countries like India were vulnerable to high hospitalisation costs. Despite its crucial importance, few primary studies are available on this aspect of the pandemic. This study was aimed at finding out the out of pocket expenditure (OOPE) and incidence of catastrophic expenditure on hospitalisation of persons infected with COVID-19. A primary survey of 492 randomly selected hospitalisations of individuals tested positive for COVID-19 in high-burden districts during August to November 2020 was carried out telephonically in Chhattisgarh state of India. Results Public hospitals accounted for 69% of the hospitalisations for COVID-19 treatment. Mean OOPE per hospitalisation was Indian Rupees (INR) 4871 in public hospitals and INR 169,504 in private hospitals. Around 3% of hospitalisations in public hospitals and 59% in private hospitals resulted in catastrophic expenditure, at a threshold of 40% of non-food annual household expenditure. Enrolment under publicly or privately funded health insurance was not effective in curtailing OOPE. Multivariate analysis showed that utilisation of private hospitals was a key determinant of incurring catastrophic expenditure.

Introduction Understanding the cost of care associated with different kinds of healthcare providers is necessary for informing the policy debates in mixed health-systems like India’s. Existing studies reporting Out of Pocket Expenditure (OOPE) per episode of outpatient care in public and private providers in India do not provide a fair comparison because they have not taken into account the government subsidies received by public facilities. Public and private health insurance in India do not cover outpatient care and for-profit providers have to meet all their costs out of the payments they take from patients. Methods The average direct cost per acute episode of outpatient care was compared for public providers, for-profit formal providers and informal private providers in Chhattisgarh state of India. For public facilities, government subsidies for various inputs were taken into account. Resources used were apportioned using Activity Based Costing. Land provided free to public facilities was counted at market prices. The study used two datasets: a) household survey on outpatient utilisation and OOPE b) facility survey of public providers to find the input costs borne by government per outpatient-episode. Results The average cost per episode of outpatient care was Indian Rupees (INR) 400 for public providers, INR 586 for informal private providers and INR 2643 for formal for-profit providers and they managed 39.3, 37.9 and 22.9% of episodes respectively. The average cost for government and households put together was greater for using formal for-profit providers than the public providers. The disease profile of care handled by different types of providers was similar. Volume of patients and human-resources were key cost drivers in public facilities. Close to community providers involved less cost than others. Conclusions and recommendations The findings have implications for the desired mix of public and private providers in India’s health-system. Poor regulation of for-profit providers was an important structural cost driver. Purchasing outpatient care from private providers may not reduce average cost. Policies to strengthen public provisioning of curative primary care close to communities can help in reducing cost.