We investigate whether qualified and experienced directors are willing to join firms following the revelation of financial fraud. Specifically, we focus on directors with prior board experience and accounting and legal experts. We find that, notwithstanding the tarnished reputation of fraudulent firms and a higher workload, qualified and experienced directors join the boards of such firms. Subsequent to joining fraudulent firms, directors are rewarded with additional future board seats and benefit from higher compensation. We rule out alternative explanations and verify the robustness of the results by performing a variety of tests, including propensity score matching and difference-in-differences analysis. JEL Classifications: G30; G34.

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This study replicates and extends the results of Field and Mkrtchyan, who find that independent directors' prior acquisition experience improves succeeding acquisition performance. First, using both the original and an extended sample period, we confirm their findings. Second, we extend their study by considering the effect of prior acquisition experience gained by the CEO as an executive or independent director. Similar to the effect documented for independent directors, we find that CEOs' acquisition experience is positively associated with subsequent acquisition performance. Consistent with CEO learning, we document a greater effect on subsequent takeover performance when acquisition experience is negative.

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