This paper proposes a method to detect bid-rigging by applying mutually reinforcing screens to a road construction procurement data set from Switzerland in which no prior information about collusion was available. The screening method is particularly suited to deal with the problem of partial collusion, i.e. collusion which does not involve all firms and/or all contracts in a specific data set, implying that many of the classical markers discussed in the corresponding literature will fail to identify bid-rigging. In addition to presenting a new screen for collusion, it is shown how benchmarks and the combination of different screens may be used to identify subsets of suspicious contracts and firms in a data set. The discussed screening method succeeds in isolating a group of "suspicious" firms exhibiting the characteristics of a local bid-rigging cartel operating with cover bids and amore or less pronounced-bid rotation scheme. Based on these findings the Swiss Competition Commission (ComCo) decided to open an investigation.

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Recent years have seen a growing literature on ex post assessment of merger cases, primarily evaluating the "correctness" of specific merger decisions by competition authorities. The question whether notifications regimes are efficient, i.e. whether competition authorities are in a position to review the set of mergers that potentially raises competitive concerns, has however largely been neglected so far. This paper attempts to fill this gap by evaluating the effectiveness of the Swiss merger notification regime. In particular, the focus lies on the level of turnover thresholds which trigger notification duties.

Summary In 2004 the Swiss Competition Commission (ComCo) opened an investigation concerning multilateral agreed interchange fees in the Swiss credit card market which ended with an amicable settlement. The most important element of this amicable settlement consists in the limitation of the interchange fee to the actual network costs of the issuers. In this paper I discuss whether there was a market failure in the Swiss credit card market which justified the intervention by ComCo and whether the remedies imposed in the amicable settlement eliminated the alleged market failure.