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The successful operation of NATO missions requires the effective and secure sharing of information among coalition partners and external organizations, while avoiding the disclosure of sensitive information to unauthorized users. To resolve the conflict between confidentiality and availability in a dynamic coalition and network environment while being able to dynamically respond to changes in protection requirements and release conditions, NATO is developing a new information sharing infrastructure. In this paper we present the Content-based Protection and Release (CPR) access control model for the NATO information sharing infrastructure. We define a declarative specification language for CPR based on the first-order logical framework underlying a class of efficient theorem-proving tools, called Satisfiability Modulo Theories solvers, and describe how they can support answering authorization queries. We illustrate the ideas in a use case scenario drawn from the NATO Passive Missile Defence system for simulating the consequences of intercepting missile attacks

The successful operation of NATO missions requires effective and secure sharing of information among coalition partners and external organizations, while avoiding the disclosure of sensitive information to untrusted users. To resolve the conflict between confidentiality and availability, NATO is developing a new information sharing infrastructure, called Content-based Protection and Release.We describe the architecture of access control in NATO operations, which is designed to be easily built on top of available (service-oriented) infrastructures for identity and access control management. We then present a use case scenario drawn from the NATO Passive Missile Defence system for simulating the consequences of intercepting missile attacks. In the system demonstration, we show how maps annotated with the findings of the system are filtered by the access control module to produce appropriate views for users with different clearances and terminals under given release and protection policies.

The correct labelling of all information at its point of origin is a critical enabler for effective information access control in modern military systems. If information is not properly labeled it cannot be shared between different communities of interest and coalition partners, which affects the responsibility to share and potentially impedes ongoing military operations. This paper describes two experiments performed at the NATO Communications and Information Agency related to supporting correct labelling of both pre-existing and newly created information objects. Two different techniques are used, one based on semantic analysis and the other on machine learning. Both approaches offer promising results in their respective use case scenarios, but require further development prior to operational deployment.

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