The number of diagnoses of developmental disorders is on the rise and the use of labels for developmental disorders, such as attention‐deficit/hyperactivity disorder and autism spectrum disorder, is widening. Diagnostic labels can play an important role in helping those who display atypical behaviour and their caregivers to cope with associated challenges and, possibly, to get treatment. But these labels are increasingly contested and associated with a variety of harmful effects. In this paper, we analyze the role diagnostic labels can play in four different contexts (scientific, therapeutic, social, and administrative) and identify what various stakeholders stand to gain or lose with continued, expanded, or abolished use of those labels. Our analysis reveals labels serve different purposes in each of these contexts, benefitting different stakeholders. Any overall evaluation, critique, or defence of labels needs to consider the interests of all stakeholders in these contexts.

In this article, I address two objections developed by Kingma against Boorse’s (1977) bio-statistical theory of health, the objections that choice of reference classes renders the theory both circular and problematically value-laden. These objections not only apply to the bio-statistical theory of health but also to other naturalistic theories, like the dispositional theory of health. I present three rejoinders. First, I argue that the circularity objection arises from excessive methodological demands. Second, I argue that naturalists can resist the normativist claim that health and pathology are differentiated on the basis of personal or cultural values. Finally, I show that it is possible to justify choices between rival theories of health without the interference of evaluative commitments. With these rejoinders, I conclude that the bio-statistical theory, as well as other naturalistic theories of health utilizing reference classes, is not undermined by Kingma’s arguments.

A satisfactory account of the nature of health is important for a wide range of theoretical and practical reasons. No theory offered in the literature thus far has been able to meet all the desiderata for an adequate theory of health. This article introduces a new theory of health, according to which health is best defined in terms of dispositions at the level of the organism as a whole. After outlining the main features of the account and providing formal definitions of ‘health’, ‘healthy’, and ‘healthier than’, I present the main strengths of the proposed account. I argue that the proposed dispositional theory accounts for all paradigm cases of health and pathology, that it circumvents a number of problems faced by rival theories, and that it makes for a naturalistic theory of health with a rigorous metaphysical underpinning. 1Introduction2The Dispositional Account3Further Specification of the Dispositional Account 3.1Reference classes3.2Comparison classes3.3Which dispositions?4Advantages of the Dispositional view5Three Objections and Replies 5.1Objection 1: Counter-examples5.2Objection 2: Issues with holism5.3Objection 3: Expediting medicalization6Final Remarks

Are mental disorders (autism, ADHD, schizophrenia) natural kinds or socially constructed categories? What is at stake if either of these views prove to be true? This paper offers a qualified defence for the view that there may be natural kinds of mental disorder, but also that the implications of this claim are generally overestimated. Especially concerns about over-inclusiveness of diagnostic categories and medicalisation of abnormal behaviour are not addressed by the debate. To arrive at these conclusions the paper opens with a discussion of kind formation in science, followed by an analysis of natural kinds. Seven principled and empirically informed objections to the possibility of natural kinds of mental disorder are considered and rejected. The paper ends with a reflection on diagnostics of mental health problems that don’t fall into natural kinds. Despite the defence of the possibility of natural kinds of mental disorder, this is likely to be the majority of cases.

No abstract