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Due to ongoing technological innovations, self-enhancement methods are publicly discussed, researched from different perspectives, and part of ethical debates. However, only few studies investigated the acceptance of these methods and its relationship with personality traits and values. The present study investigated to what extent people accept different enhancement methods and whether acceptance can be predicted by Big Five and Dark Triad traits, vulnerable narcissism, and values. In an online survey (N = 450), we measured personality traits and values. Additionally, participants read scenarios about enhancement methods and answered questions about their acceptance of these scenarios. Factor analysis indicated a general factor of acceptance across scenarios. Correlation analyses showed that high agreeableness, agreeableness-compassion, conscientiousness, conscientiousness-industriousness, and conservation- and self-transcendence values are related to less acceptance of self-enhancement. Moreover, individuals high on Dark Triad traits, vulnerable narcissism, and self-enhancement values exhibit more acceptance. Hierarchical regression analysis revealed that said values and Big Five traits explained unique variance in the acceptance of self-enhancement. These findings highlight the importance of considering personality and values when investigating self-enhancement—a topic that is receiving increasing attention by the public, politicians, and scientists.

Modern technical tools such as tablets allow for the temporal externalization of working memory processes (i.e. cognitive offloading). Although such externalizations support immediate performance on different tasks, little is known about potential long-term consequences of offloading behavior. In the current set of experiments, we studied the relationship between cognitive offloading and subsequent memory for the offloaded information as well as the interplay of this relationship with the goal to acquire new memory representations. Our participants solved the Pattern Copy Task, in which we manipulated the costs of cognitive offloading and the awareness of a subsequent memory test. In Experiment 1 (N = 172), we showed that increasing the costs for offloading induces reduced offloading behavior. This reduction in offloading came along with lower immediate task performance but more accurate memory in an unexpected test. In Experiment 2 (N = 172), we confirmed these findings and observed that offloading behavior remained detrimental for subsequent memory performance when participants were aware of the upcoming memory test. Interestingly, Experiment 3 (N = 172) showed that cognitive offloading is not detrimental for long-term memory formation under all circumstances. Those participants who were forced to offload maximally but were aware of the memory test could almost completely counteract the negative impact of offloading on memory. Our experiments highlight the importance of the explicit goal to acquire new memory representations when relying on technical tools as offloading did have detrimental effects on memory without such a goal.

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