This article analyses the role of the EU institutions in guiding the EMU reform process. Many have argued that the institutions have had to adapt to a 'constraining' environment in which EU negotiations are highly salient and touch upon 'core state powers'. To explain how they have been adapting, we provide a detailed process tracing analysis of their role in setting up the banking union. We use insights from principal-agent (PA) theorizing, but extend this framework to account for situations in which there are multiple agents. The analysis shows that in spite of overlapping interests, functional imperatives and a crisis atmosphere, there was nothing inevitable about the banking union. It came about through new patterns of institutional collaboration at different stages and between different levels of decision making. We explore the implications of this type of collaborative leadership at the level of agents, arenas, process and substance.

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This paper contributes to a new understanding of the role and influence of the EU institutions in dealing with major EU reforms. Many have argued that, due to successive crises, Eurozone, Refugee and Brexit, EU decision making has become more intergovernmental. The role of the main intergovernmental body, the European Council, has been enhanced. Moreover, at various moments during these crises, the political leaders chose to bypass the Community framework, and opt for intergovernmental solutions. However, in the literature, intergovernmentalism also refers to a dominance of the member states vis-à-vis the institutions in shaping these agreements. This paper looks at the process-level implications of this increased intergovernmentalism. We analyse and compare the role and influence of the institutions in five major reform negotiations: EFSF/ESM, Fiscal Compact, banking union, EU-Turkey deal and British renegotiation. An exploration of these empirical micro-foundations reveals more institution-driven processes and outcomes than the label intergovernmentalist suggests.