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It is generally assumed that family firms emphasize socioemotional wealth, which exacerbates wealth expropriation from noncontrolling shareholders. We examine this issue in the context of nonfamily shareholders, specifically institutional investors, and find that institutional investors avoid investments in family firms. Furthermore, integrating institutional theory with a socioemotional wealth approach, we find that financial regulation can mitigate external investors’ concerns. These two results are important theoretically because they provide insight into the effect of agency problems specific to family firms and are important for management practice because they can provide guidance for family firms interested in new sources of capital.

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Purpose – This study aims to examine the value relevance of ethics information. Design/methodology/approach – This study adopts event study methodology to test the market’s reaction around the announcements of World’s Most Ethical Companies (WME), a ranking based on firms’ overall corporate social responsibility performance. The authors calculate the abnormal returns of firms on the WME lists to investigate how stockholders respond to the disclosure of ethical information. Findings – The authors find significant and positive abnormal returns around the announcements of the lists of ethical firms. Specifically, positive market reaction on the first day after the WME announcement (Day 1) is observed. Originality/value – This study contributes to the existing literature of the relationship between business ethics and firm value. The authors provide evidence that ethics can be aligned with firms’ financial goals. Further, this study is the first to use the WME announcement as a proxy for ethical firms.

Increasing regulatory pressures have created specialization within boards, with more requirements and responsibilities being refocused to the committee level. Using data from S&P 1,500 firms, we find that board committee overlap associated with linking pin directors (i.e., those serving simultaneously on the audit and compensation committees) is an important conduit for knowledge transfer between boards' monitoring and incentive alignment functions. These directors are associated with lower executive compensation and influence pay mix. In studying the dynamics behind this process, we find that newly created linking pins improve monitoring effectiveness whereas recently dissolved linking pins decrease it. We also find that linking pins are all the more important when managers make less conservative accounting choices. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.