In this paper, we describe a novel approach to scalable group re-keying for secure multicast.

Sensor networks are often deployed in unattended environments, thus leaving these networks vulnerable to false data injection attacks in which an adversary injects false data into the network with the goal of deceiving the base station or depleting the resources of the relaying nodes. Standard authentication mechanisms cannot prevent this attack if the adversary has compromised one or a small number of sensor nodes. We present three interleaved hop-by-hop authentication schemes that guarantee that the base station can detect injected false data immediately when no more than t nodes are compromised, where t is a system design parameter. Moreover, these schemes enable an intermediate forwarding node to detect and discard false data packets as early as possible. Our performance analysis shows that our scheme is efficient with respect to the security it provides, and it also allows a tradeoff between security and performance. A prototype implementation of our scheme indicates that our scheme is practical and can be deployed on the current generation of sensor nodes. ACM Reference Format:Zhu, S., Setia, S., Jajodia, S., and Ning, P. 2007. Interleaved hop-by-hop authentication against false data injection attacks in sensor networks.

Wireless sensor nodes lack hardware support for tamperresistance and are often deployed in unattended environments, thus leaving them vulnerable to capture and compromise by an adversary. In a node replication attack, an adversary uses the credentials of a compromised node to surreptitiously introduce replicas of that node into the network. These replicas are then used to launch a variety of attacks that subvert the goal of the sensor application, and the operation of the underlying protocols. We present a novel distributed approach called Localized Multicast for detecting node replication attacks. We evaluate the performance and security of our approach both theoretically and via simulation. Our results show that Localized Multicast is more efficient than previous distributed approaches in terms of communication and memory costs. Further, in our approach, the probability of detecting node replicas is much higher than that achieved in previous distributed protocols.

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Abstract-Most of the multicast routing protocols proposed for ad hoc networks assume a trusted, non-adversarial environment and do not take security issues into account in their design. In this paper, we investigate the security of MAODV (Multicast Ad hoc On-Demand Distance Vector protocol), a well-known multicast routing protocol, and identify several attacks on it. We show, via simulation, that these attacks can have a significant impact on the performance of MAODV. We present an authentication framework for MAODV and propose countermeasures that can prevent or mitigate the impact of these attacks.