PurposeThis paper examines credit products, operational performance and business models employed by nontraditional lenders (NTLs) in agricultural credit markets.Design/methodology/approachTwo research methods were employed in this study: (1) an executive interview to collect primary data and (2) a case study approach to analyze the findings and develop insights.FindingsThe findings indicate the presence of significant differences among lenders across and within three categories of NTLs (large volume, vendor financing and collateral-based NTLs). For example, collateral-based NTLs employ different strategies focusing on types of loans, funding sources, commodities they support and geographic coverage to further segment the market. NTLs in this study were able to capture market by successfully identifying gaps in the supply side of agricultural credit and developing products that meet the needs of that niche (e.g. heavy renters, large operations, producers seeking fixed interest rates for term loans, financially fragile producers). Most of the interviewed NTLs had credit standards comparable to those of traditional lenders and consider them both competitors and partners since many NTLs partner with traditional lenders on participation loans, loan servicing and/or sourcing funds.Originality/valueThe supply side of a nontraditional lending has not been studied extensively due to the proprietary nature of data. The executive interviews conducted in this study allowed for accumulation of industry data, which is not available otherwise.

Abstract:Land acquisition by the government or a private entity to aid industrialization remains a critical policy concern. In 2013, The Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act (LARR Act of 2013) became the premier land law in India. The Act creates a transparent process through which buyers can acquire land for industrialization and other commercial activities. However, the succeeding government was dissatisfied with some provisions in the original Act and floated two Amendment Bills in 2014 and 2015. In this article, we examine if the proposed removal of the "Consent" clause, a key provision in the original Act, is necessary. The removal would allow the government to impose eminent domain under certain conditions. We propose that removing the "Consent" clause is necessary for social welfare maximization and maintain that compensation based on marginal utility of income is the correct approach as it maximizes social welfare and helps maintain a balanced budget.

In this article, we empirically examine the impact of farm size and insured type on returns from crop insurance participation in four regions using unit‐level crop insurance contract data. Our quasi‐panel empirical model provides guidance on whether larger producers are riskier than smaller producers and whether cash producers are riskier than landlords. In our sample, we did not find evidence that large producers obtain higher returns from insurance participation than their smaller counterparts. In fact, we found evidence of the opposite that larger producers in Iowa and Nebraska receive less than their smaller counterparts. Our farm size results suggest that any legislation limiting crop insurance participation from large producers would negatively influence the insurance pool, driving up premiums and consequently administrative and operational subsidies and per‐acre premium subsidy dollars. We did find evidence that cash insured types get more back in insurance than landlords in both Montana and Oklahoma, suggesting the possibility of moral hazard in input usage. Our results also highlight spatial differences in crop insurance outcomes.

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