PurposePolicy makers are applying market-inspired competition and financial incentives to drive efficiency in healthcare. However, a lack of knowledge exists about the process whereby incentives are filtered through organizations to influence staff motivation, and the key role of managers is often overlooked. The purpose of this paper is to explore the strategies managers use as intermediaries between financial incentives and the individual motivation of staff. The authors use empirical data from a local case in Swedish specialized care.Design/methodology/approachThe authors conducted an exploratory qualitative case study of a patient-choice reform, including financial incentives, in specialized orthopedics in Sweden. In total, 17 interviews were conducted with professionals in managerial positions, representing six healthcare providers. A hypo-deductive, thematic approach was used to analyze the data.FindingsThe results show that managers applied alignment strategies to make the incentive model motivating for staff. The managers’ strategies are characterized by attempts to align external rewards with professional values based on their contextual and practical knowledge. Managers occasionally overruled the financial logic of the model to safeguard patient needs and expressed an interest in having a closer dialogue with policy makers about improvements.Originality/valueExternally imposed incentives do not automatically motivate healthcare staff. Managers in healthcare play key roles as intermediaries by aligning external rewards with professional values. Managers’ multiple perspectives on healthcare practices and professional culture can also be utilized to improve policy and as a source of knowledge in partnership with policy makers.

Background New Public Management (NPM) has been widely used to introduce competition into public healthcare. Results have been mixed, and there has been much controversy about the appropriateness of a private sector-mimicking governance model in a public service. One voice in the debate suggested that rather than discussing whether competition is “good” or “bad” the emphasis should be on exploring the conditions for a successful implementation. Methods We report a longitudinal case study of the introduction of patient choice and allowing private providers to enter a publicly funded market. Patients in need of hip or knee replacement surgery are allowed to choose provider, and those are paid a fixed reimbursement for the full care episode (bundled payment). Providers are financially accountable for complications. Data on number of patients, waiting lists and times, costs to the public purchaser, and complications were collected from public registries. Providers were interviewed at three points in time during a nine-year follow-up period. Time-series of the quantitative data were exhibited and the views of actors involved were explored in a thematic analysis of the interviews. Results The policy goals of improving access to care and care quality while controlling total costs were achieved in a sustained way. Six themes were identified among actors interviewed and those were consistent over time. The design of the patient choice model was accepted, although all providers were discontent with the level of reimbursement. Providers felt that quality, timeliness of service and staff satisfaction had improved. Public and private providers differed in terms of patient-mix and developed different strategies to adjust to the reimbursement system. Private providers were more active in marketing and improving operation room efficiency. All providers intensified cooperation with referring physicians. Close attention was paid to following the rules set by the purchaser. Discussion and conclusions The sustained cost control was an effect of bundled payment. What this study shows is that both public and private providers adhere long-term to regulations by a public purchaser that also controls entrance to the market. The compensation was fixed and led to competition on quality, as predicted by theory.

Background Many interventions used in health care lack evidence of effectiveness and may be unnecessary or even cause harm, and should therefore be de-implemented. Lists of such ineffective, low-value practices are common, but these lists have little chance of leading to improvements without sufficient knowledge regarding how de-implementation can be governed and carried out. However, decisions regarding de-implementation are not only a matter of scientific evidence; the puzzle is far more complex with political, economic, and relational interests play a role. This project aims at exploring the governance of de-implementation of low-value practices from the perspectives of national and regional governments and senior management at provider organizations. Methods Theories of complexity science and organizational alignment are used, and interviews are conducted with stakeholders involved in the governance of low-value practice de-implementation, including national and regional governments (focusing on two contrasting regions in Sweden) and senior management at provider organizations. In addition, an ongoing process for governing de-implementation in accordance with current recommendations is followed over an 18-month period to explore how governance is conducted in practice. A framework for the governance of de-implementation and policy suggestions will be developed to guide de-implementation governance. Discussion This study contributes to knowledge about the governance of de-implementation of low-value care practices. The study provides rich empirical data from multiple system levels regarding how de-implementation of low-value practices is currently governed. The study also makes a theoretical contribution by applying the theories of complexity and organizational alignment, which may provide generalizable knowledge about the interplay between stakeholders across system levels and how and why certain factors influence the governance of de-implementation. The project employs a solution-oriented perspective by developing a framework for de-implementation of low-value practices and suggesting practical strategies to improve the governance of de-implementation. The framework and strategies can thereafter be evaluated for validity and impact in future studies.

BackgroundIn publicly funded health care systems, governance models are developed to push public service providers to use tax payers’ money more efficiently and maintain a high quality of service. Although this implies change in staff behaviors, evaluation studies commonly focus on organizational outputs. Unintended consequences for staff have been observed in case studies, but theoretical and methodological development is necessary to enable studies of staff experience in larger populations across various settings. The aim of the study is to develop a self-assessment scale of staff experience of the governance of economic efficiency and quality of health care and to assess its psychometric properties.MethodsFactors relevant to staff members’ experience of economic efficiency and quality requirements of health care were identified in the literature and through interviews with practitioners, and then compared to a theoretical model of behavior change. Relevant experiences were developed into sub-factors and items. The scale was tested in collaboration with the Department of Rehabilitation Medicine at a university hospital. 93 staff members participated. The scale’s psychometric properties were assessed using exploratory factor analysis, analysis of internal consistency and criterion-related validity.ResultsThe analysis revealed an eight factor structure (including sub-factors knowledge and awareness, opportunity to influence, motivation, impact on professional autonomy and organizational alignment), and items showed strong factor loadings and high internal consistency within sub-factors. Sub-factors were interrelated and contributed to the prediction of impact on clinical behavior (criterion).ConclusionsThe scale clearly distinguishes between various experiences regarding economic efficiency and quality requirements among health care staff, and shows satisfactory psychometric quality. The scale has broad applications for research and practice, as it serves as a tool for capturing staff members’ perspectives when evaluating and improving health care governance. The scale could also be useful for understanding the underlying processes of changes in provider performance and for adapting management strategies to engage staff in driving change that contributes to increased economic efficiency and quality, for the benefit of health care systems, patients and staff.Electronic supplementary materialThe online version of this article (10.1186/s12913-018-3765-7) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

Implementation of market-inspired competition and incentive models in health care is increasing worldwide, assumed to drive efficiency. However, the evidence for effects is mixed and unintended consequences have been reported. There is a need to better understand the practical consequences of such reforms. The aim of the present case study is to explore what consequences of a Swedish market-inspired patient choice reform professionals identify as relevant, and why. The study was designed as an explorative qualitative study in specialized orthopedics. Nineteen interviews were conducted with health care professionals at different providers. Data were analyzed using a hypo-deductive thematic approach. Consequences for the organization of care, patients, work environment, education and research were included in the professionals' analyses, covering both the perspective of their own organization and that of the health care system as a whole. In sum, the professionals provided multiple-level analyses that extended beyond the responsibilities of their own organization. Concluding, professionals are a valuable source of knowledge when evaluating policy reforms. Their analyses can contribute by covering a broad system perspective, serving as a guiding light to areas beyond the most obvious evaluation measures that should be included in more formal evaluations.