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We investigate whether politically sensitive contractors pay higher taxes and whether their bargaining power reduces these tax costs. Using federal contractor data, we develop a new composite measure of political sensitivity that captures both the political visibility arising from federal contracts and the importance of federal contracts to the firm. We proxy for bargaining power using the firm-level proportion of contract revenues not subject to competition, the firm-level proportion of contract revenues arising from defense contracts, and industry-level concentration ratios. We find that politically sensitive firms pay higher federal taxes, all else equal. However, firms with greater bargaining power incur fewer tax-related political costs. Our study provides new evidence on the political cost hypothesis in a tax setting and the first evidence of the interactive effects of a firm's political sensitivity and bargaining power on tax-related political costs. JEL Classifications: M41; H26

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Evidence evaluation in accounting often involves both the assessment of evidence relevance and the combination of its relevance and source to assess overall strength. We decompose this strength-assessment judgment into its components—relevance assessment and source and relevance combination—and consider the effects of experience. Participants in our experiment assess the strength and relevance of tax authorities in relation to a client scenario. Contrary to prior research, we find that more-experienced participants exhibit greater use of analogical reasoning when evaluating tax-authority relevance than do less-experienced participants. We find a similar experience effect in the use of configural information processing to combine authority source and relevance, a judgment not previously considered in tax. The effects of experience are particularly important in the current environment as the tax function is a leading cause of material weaknesses and restatements under Sarbanes-Oxley and tax executives cite increasing difficulty in hiring and retaining qualified professionals. Data Availability: Data are available from the authors on request.

We refine and extend Seetharaman (1994) using tax-return-level Statistics of Income data that represent the population of 1992 federal individual income tax returns. Our results indicate that while the standard deduction, exemptions and tax rate schedule continue to contribute the most to progressivity, the rate schedule plays a much greater role (and the standard deduction and exemptions a much lesser role) than previously reported. In addition, consistent with Dunbar (1996), we find that tax credits, in particular the earned income credit, have a substantial effect on overall tax progressivity. Although itemized deductions continue to reduce overall progressivity, with housing costs (mortgage interest and real estate taxes) and state and local income tax deductions being the dominant items, our results indicate that their effect on tax progressivity is smaller than indicated in the earlier study. Finally, we find that the effect of the income tax system on income inequality is more pronounced than previously reported, especially when the data are partitioned by filing status.