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In 1931, Paneth identified a dual meaning of the term “chemical element,” translated as “basic substance” and “simple substance.” Since then multiple philosophers of chemistry have also identified ambiguities surrounding this concept, and the IUPAC still holds a double definition today. This paper aims to help resolve this ambiguity through an analysis and reinterpretation of the two meanings of the term “element” proposed by Paneth. It is important to distinguish between elements as substances and elements as constituents, because the elementary substances disappear when elements enter into compounds, whereas the constituent subsists. The notion of simple substance fails to capture the stability of the element as a constituent of matter, and Paneth’s metaphysical idea of basic substance is contradictory with a concept of element that evolved thanks to scientific practice, not independent of it. Since these meanings are mutually exclusive, their combination within one term is problematic; yet, this paper will show that neither of them individually suffice to qualify the element. Therefore, based on a brief analysis of the history of chemistry, I will propose a way of rethinking Paneth’s distinction in order to understand the different aspects of this complex chemical concept. Though there is a certain duality to the notion of element in the sense that it can be characterized both as an abstract constituent and as a chemical substance, the term “element” does not have two distinct meanings; it refers to the element in all forms of chemical combination.

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