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This article addresses the extent to which metropolitan regions have continued to fragment and grown more disparate. We ask, why have comprehensive institutions not taken root to mitigate metropolitan fragmentation and how can we better understand its persistence? We call attention to the insufficiently understood and integrative role of public authorities as functional for fragmented metropolises and their continued splintering. That functionality is explained by a “regional paradox,” which states that centrifugal forces from autonomous, competitive local governments push against metropolitan integration while centripetal pressures for regional policy coherence pull toward it. The result is the embodiment of both tendencies in what we call fragmented regionalism—a condition where local autonomy is largely left intact while public authorities are able to manage selective regional pressures. We find that metropolitan regions have become more fragmented and more unequal. This pattern is concomitant with public authority spending, which has favored the most advantaged metropolises.

Proponents of metropolitan consolidation identify a range of benefits that may be realized through merger, including improved financial health. There is little agreement as to the actual outcomes across localities that have consolidated, even when limiting the scope to the four major urban mergers, including the merger of Louisville, Kentucky with Jefferson County in 2003, which is under consideration here. One likely reason for conflicting results is the limitation of reflexive analysis as a means of assessing financial impact. In the private sector, analysts would use financial ratio analysis to determine whether the new merged entity was financially healthier after merger. Though a political merger differs from a private sector merger, financial ratio analysis can still be used for pre-and post-analysis of merger effects on financial health. Further, when enough time has passed since merger, quasi-experimental designs like interrupted time series can test the hypothesis that merger had no significant financial impact on the entity at all.

Critics often take their subjects on worthy journeys. Lidstrom has done this through a comparative approach. He draws parallels between American public authorities and European “inter-municipal cooperation”. While comparisons can be useful the parallels have limitations, and we point out that public authorities, “transcend local interests” whereas “inter-local agreements” reflect local interests. Lewis opens a new vista on the American landscape by demonstrating how numerous institutions work across jurisdictions. He shows there are functional equivalents to public authorites that work as “kludges” to patch together fragmented metropolises. Barnes takes us down a rockier road. He attributes much to our article that was neither written nor intended. Barnes’ critique is lodged in an assertion that we envisioned regionalism as an “ideal” of “one big metro government”. We take issue with this premise and its conclusions.

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