Incorporating socio-economic considerations (SECs) into national biosafety regulations regarding genetically modified (GM) crops have opportunity costs. Australia approved the cultivation of GM canola through a science-based risk assessment in 2003, but allowed state moratoria to be instituted based on potential trade impacts over the period 2004 to 2008 and 2010 in the main canola growing states. This analysis constructs a counterfactual assessment using Canadian GM canola adoption data to create an S-Curve of adoption in Australia to measure the environmental and economic opportunity costs of Australia's SEC-based moratoria between 2004 and 2014. The environmental impacts are measured through the amount of chemical active ingredients applied during pest management, the Environmental Impact Quotient indicator, and greenhouse gas emissions. The economic impacts are measured through the variable costs of the weed control programs, yield and the contribution margin. The environmental opportunity costs from delaying the adoption of GM canola in Australia include an additional 6.5 million kilograms of active ingredients applied to canola land; a 14.3% increase in environmental impact to farmers, consumers and the ecology; 8.7 million litres of diesel fuel burned; and an additional 24.2 million kilograms of greenhouse gas (GHG) and compound emissions released. The economic opportunity costs of the SEC-based moratoria resulted in foregone output of 1.1 million metric tonnes of canola and a net economic loss to canola farmers' of AU$485.6 million. The paper provides some of the first quantified, post-adoption evidence on the opportunity cost and environmental impacts of incorporating SECs into GM crop regulation.

Trade is an integral part of the Canadian economy. The main institutional drivers governing trade are bilateral and multilateral agreements outlining permissible trade distorting measures. Since its inception in 1972, Canada's supply management system has remained protected throughout trade negotiations. The system appears, by any economic measure, to be having an increasingly disproportional influence in recent trade negotiations. However, trade agreements serve not only to maximize social surplus, but also to maximize some measure of political welfare. Canada has recently negotiated three prominent trade agreements: the Canada-European Union Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) came into effect in the latter part of 2017; the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) came into effect at the end of 2018; and the Canada-United States-Mexico Agreement (CUSMA) could come into effect as early as late 2019. Collectively, these agreements have guaranteed increased market access for fresh and processed dairy products. We build a spatial partial equilibrium model of the Canadian dairy industry consisting of three regions and ten commodities to assess the individual and cumulative effect of these trade agreements. We pay particular attention to the institutional drivers within today's dairy sector: milk protein concentrates; component pricing including Class 7; and differential demand growth. We find that the aggregate impacts are: (i) a 7.0% decrease in the marginal retail price; (ii) a 4.7% decrease in the blended producer price; and (iii) an overall increase in social welfare of 5.5%. Worth noting, the decrease in producer surplus varies from 3.1% in the western region to 6.3% in the eastern region. Our results may be relevant to future negotiations as well as the publicly promised compensation package for dairy producers.

African swine fever (ASF), a highly contagious disease affecting domestic and wild pigs, has been spreading globally, with devastating impacts on hog markets. The European Union saw pork exports decrease by €556 million (9%) as a result of ASF outbreaks across four countries in 2014. Similarly, in 2018, when ASF was first reported in China, there was a 30% decrease in the Chinese pig inventory and in total pork production. ASF’s eventual spread to North America seems inevitable. Given Canada’s export-oriented pork industry, the economic costs and animal welfare impacts of an ASF outbreak in the Canadian hog sector could prove devastating as a result of potential border closures and large-scale animal depopulation. To estimate the impacts, we build a partial equilibrium, vertically integrated model of Ontario’s pork industry from the breeding herd through to end consumer. If an outbreak occurred in a central production region of Ontario, we estimate that Ontario’s pork industry would experience a welfare loss of C$860 million (28.1%). Conversely, if an outbreak occurred in Western Canada, the Ontario pork industry would benefit by C$198 million (6.5%). Not surprisingly, an outbreak will redistribute significant economic rents in the sector depending on where exactly the first outbreak occurs.

The unexpected introduction and spread of coronavirus disease-2019 (COVID-19) has presented significant risks for every aspect of Canadian society, including the food and agricultural sector. The suite of Business Risk Management (BRM) programs, developed decades ago and without any thought to the possibility of a global pandemic, are meant to assist farmers in managing risks. This article discusses to what extent these BRM programs, and more broadly government programs, assisted farmers in managing risks brought on by the pandemic. Despite calls by industry for significant additional public funds, we find that COVID-19 exposed no significant gaps in BRM programming and therefore we see no reason for more funding to be funneled to the farm sector through BRM programming. RésuméL'introduction et la propagation inattendues de la COVID-19 ont présenté des risques importants pour tous les aspects de la société canadienne, y compris le secteur alimentaire et agricole. La suite de programmes de gestion des risques de l'entreprise (GRE), développés il y a des décennies et sans aucune réflexion sur la possibilité d'une pandémie mondiale, sont destinés à aider les agriculteurs à gérer les risques. Cet article explique dans quelle mesure ces programmes de GRE, et plus largement les programmes gouvernementaux, ont aidé les agriculteurs à gérer les risques induits par la pandémie. Malgré les appels de l'industrie pour des fonds publics supplémentaires importants, nous constatons que COVID-19 n'a révélé aucune lacune significative dans la suite GRE et, par conséquent, nous ne voyons aucune raison pour que plus de financement soit acheminé vers le secteur agricole par le biais de la GRE. INTRODUCTIONThe coronavirus disease-2019 (COVID-19) pandemic presented many uncertainties for farmers: farmer sickness; farm labour and specifically the supply of out-of-country seasonal farm workers; delivery of inputs (seed, fertilizer, chicks, etc.); planting and harvesting; transportation of livestock and crops; temporary or extended closure of processing and packing facilities; border thickening or closures; exchange rate volatility; and, finally, changes in consumer demand. In response, there were a multitude of calls by industry for significant public financial aid. For example, the Canadian Federation of Agriculture (CFA) asked the Federal Government to provide $2.6 billion in response to COVID-19 as a first phase of support