As the Latino population in the United States grows, it is increasingly important to understand how the unique experience of Latino judges translates into legal decisions. This experience has included, until recently, a bipartisan prioritization to appoint Latinos to the federal judiciary. For the first time, we analyze the judicial decision-making of Latino judges with enough observations to provide robust results. We find that the differences in priorities between the two parties have typically meant more conservative Latino judges on the bench. Using the Carp-Manning U.S. District Court Case Database, we analyze the decisions of Latino judges to determine policy areas where they diverge from their non-Latino counterparts. We find strong evidence that, under certain partisan, ideological, and policy-specific conditions, Latino judges decide differently than non-Latino judges.

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Despite evidence that racial diversification has increased support for the judiciary, political scientists know little about the heterogeneous effects of diversification across different population segments. Previous research illustrates that including Black judges increases judicial legitimacy among the Black population, but it decreases the legitimacy of the courts among the White population. We expand on this knowledge by examining the impact of adding Latinos to the bench. Our survey experiment compares White respondents’ perception of the courts based on differing levels of Latino representation in the ruling panel. Does descriptive representation in the racialized issue area of immigration signal fairness and legitimacy to White respondents? Or does the inclusion of Latino jurists in immigration cases trigger racial animosity and decreasing support for the courts? We find that when the court rules against the White respondent’s preference, they tend to penalize all-White judicial panels that rule against the perceived interest of Latinos. Additionally, we find that when presented with a Latino majority panel, White respondents who disagree with the ruling are more likely to punish the anti-Latino decisions as their levels of group consciousness increase. Ultimately, our findings illustrate how judicial diversity may affect the countermajoritarian capacity of the judiciary.

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