After a 3-wk gastrocnemius-stretching program, when measuring dorsiflexion with the STJ positioned in supination, the participants who completed a 3-wk gastrocnemius stretching program with the STJ positioned in pronation showed more increased dorsiflexion at the ankle/rear foot than participants who completed the stretching program with the STJ positioned in supination.

Trade unions are ostensibly democratic organizations, but they often fail to operate as democracies in practice. Most studies of Western trade union democracy have acknowledged that oligarchy is the norm among unions but have nonetheless examined exceptional democratic unions to understand how those unions defied the trend. My study inverts this approach and instead examines two known oligarchical unions, the Australian Workers Union (AWU) and the United Automobile Workers (UAW) in the United States. I argue that union oligarchy requires certain conditions to thrive. Both unions lacked democratic rules, close-knit occupational communities, local autonomy, rank-and-file decision making, internal opposition, equality between members and officials, and free communication, but these absences were expressed in different ways in each organization. Comparing a prominent US union with a prominent Australian union allows for assessment of the extent to which oligarchy was the result of national context. I argue that the experience of trade union oligarchy in the United States and Australia was more similar than different. National differences between the two countries were important, but they manifested primarily as different methods to achieve similar outcomes.

This article considers whether the Commonwealth’s approach to rights constitutionalism, associated with the bills of rights adopted in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the UK, might be suitable for other jurisdictions around the world. It argues that three questions are particularly relevant to evaluating the strength of the normative case for the Commonwealth’s approach. First, what is the nature of the disagreements about rights in a jurisdiction? Second, what options do institutions have to challenge the determinations on rights of other institutions? Third, what are the other objectives of the constitutional system? The article considers how the answers to these questions yield insights into the circumstances in which the Commonwealth’s approach may prove to be more attractive or unattractive. In particular, it suggests that the normative case for the Commonwealth’s approach may be weaker in dominant party systems.

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