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In response to several problems identified in the primary and secondary literature, this article advances an "expressive" conception of action and agency that (i) is consistent with the metaphysics of Deleuze and Guattari's A Thousand Plateaus, (ii) can underpin the ethical dimensions of this text, and (iii) meets some of the general requirements of a philosophy of action. This conception will be distinguished from standard theories in the philosophy of action, to the extent that these latter conceptualize and explain action with reference to intentions taken as psychological causes that are specifiable in advance and independently of the resultant activity. But it will also be distinguished from commentaries that, after rightly identifying the standard conception of intentional action as incompatible with Deleuze and Guattari's metaphysics, fail to substitute a viable conception of action and agency in its stead. In short, drawing on a notion of expression, this article will advance a conception of intentions that does not treat them as prior and independently specifiable causes of action, but rather as "immanent" causes whose intelligible content is inseparable from-that is, dynamically assembled and specified within-the ecologically and socially situated, temporally extended and realitytransforming actions they animate.

This article synthesizes several different studies of Hegel's and Nietzsche's expressive conceptions of action and agency and identifies a related account in Deleuze's Logic of Sense. It argues that such conceptions not only challenge familiar voluntarist accounts of action and agency; they also demand a reassessment of standard approaches to the relation between norms and action. For the voluntarist, an agent's action is caused by the separate, prior intention of the agent. For expressivists, an agent's intention is inseparable from the action expressing it and nonisolatable from the expression of this intention-action in interpretative activity. For the voluntarist, the norms governing action can be thought of as more or less freestanding, entering into the prior formation of the agent's intention. For the expressivist, the norm or principle on which an agent acts will be produced over time, through the unfolding of the action expressing it, as well as through interpretative struggle over the meaning of that action, all of which takes place in a social space governed by more basic norms concerning the offering of actdescriptions, recognition, and social and hermeneutical struggle. A number of important differences among Hegel's, Nietzsche's, and Deleuze's accounts are identified, and their significance is explored.