In two studies, a newly devised test (framed-line test) was used to examine the hypothesis that individuals engaging in Asian cultures are more capable of incorporating contextual information and those engaging in North American cultures are more capable of ignoring contextual information. On each trial, participants were presented with a square frame, within which was printed a vertical line. Participants were then shown another square frame of the same or different size and asked to draw a line that was identical to the first line in either absolute length (absolute task) or proportion to the height of the surrounding frame (relative task). The results supported the hypothesis: Whereas Japanese were more accurate in the relative task, Americans were more accurate in the absolute task. Moreover, when engaging in another culture, individuals tended to show the cognitive characteristic common in the host culture.

224This article explores a well-known finding in the memory literature: that estimates of categorized stimuli are often remembered as being more typical members of their categories than they actually are. Known variously as the central tendency bias or schema effect, this phenomenon has been described by several psychologists as perceptual or memory distortions (Bartlett, 1932;Estes, 1997;Hollingworth, 1910;Poulton, 1979). Alternatively, Huttenlocher and colleagues (e.g., Crawford, Huttenlocher, & Engebretson, 2000;Huttenlocher, Hedges, & Vevea, 2000) have proposed a rational basis for these effects. They argued that this bias arises from an adaptive Bayesian process that improves accuracy in estimation. The category adjustment model (CAM) proposes that stimuli are encoded at two levels of detail: as members of a category, and as fine-grain values. In reconstructing stimuli, people combine information from both category and fine-grain levels of detail. This combination results in estimates adjusted toward the central region of their categories. This adjustment reduces the mean square error of estimates at any given stimulus value enough to more than compensate for the bias introduced into individual estimates (Huttenlocher et al., 2000, p. 240).In their model, a category is a bounded range of stimulus values that vary along a stimulus dimension, such as size, weight, or intelligence. Memory for a stimulus is a fine-grain value along a dimension, such as a specific person's height. If the remembered value is inexact, the model proposes that the estimate (R) of the stimulus is a weighted combination of a category's central value ( ) and the inexact fine-grain memory (M ) for a particular stimulus. The weight given to the fine-grain and category levels varies as a function of the dispersion of the category ( 2 ) and the degree of inexactness surrounding the fine-grain memory ( 2 M ) and is derived from Bayes's theorem. To illustrate the Bayesian principle underlying the model, consider the example in Figure 1. The figure depicts a category with a normal frequency distribution of instances that varies along a continuous dimension. If a fine-grain memory for a stimulus falls at value M, and there is uncertainty surrounding the stimulus's true value, it is more likely that the stimulus's true value is in Direction A (toward the direction where the majority of instances fall) than in Direction B (where there are fewer instances). The combination of information about the prior distribution with the present distribution of inexactness surrounding the true value for M results in biased estimates that are more likely to fall in Region A than in Region B. The category adjustment model (CAM) proposes that estimates of inexactly remembered stimuli are adjusted toward the central value of the category of which the stimuli are members. Adjusting estimates toward the average value of all category instances, properly weighted for memory uncertainty, maximizes the average accuracy of estimates. Thus far, the CAM has been tested o...

Four experiments that show an early ability to encode and retain information about extent are presented. We found that infants discriminate between the heights of dowels in a habituation task. We also found that toddlers discriminate between heights on a choice task in which a target dowel is presented and removed and they then choose between the target and a foil. Until 4 years of age, however, discrimination occurs only in the presence of a perceptually salient standard. Adults do not require a perceptually present standard; they can assess extent across temporal or spatial gaps by imposing a standard (measure). The present findings indicate that infants and toddlers do not possess an adult ability to establish extent, but that they do possess a skill that provides a start point for this important intellectual achievement.

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We …nd that di¤erences in the ability to devote cognitive resources to a strategic interaction imply di¤erences in strategic behavior. In our experiment, we manipulate the availability of cognitive resources by applying a di¤erential cognitive load. In cognitive load experiments, subjects are directed to perform a task which occupies cognitive resources, in addition to making a choice in another domain. The greater the cognitive resources required for the task implies that fewer such resources will be available for deliberation on the choice. Although much is known about how subjects make decisions under a cognitive load, little is known about how this a¤ects behavior in strategic games. We run an experiment in which subjects play a repeated multi-player prisoner's dilemma game under two cognitive load treatments. In one treatment, subjects are placed under a high cognitive load (given a 7 digit number to recall) and subjects in the other are placed under a low cognitive load (given a 2 digit number). According to two di¤erent measures, we …nd evidence that the low load subjects behave more strategically. First, the behavior of the low load subjects converged to the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium prediction at a faster rate than the high load subjects. Second, we …nd evidence that low load subjects were better able to condition their behavior on the outcomes of previous periods.