Modern reforms meant to incentivize public managers to be more innovative and accepting of risk are often implicitly based in the longstanding assumption that public employees are more risk averse than their private sector counterparts. We argue, however, that there is more to learn about the degree to which public and private managers differ in terms of risk aversion.  In order to address this gap, we field a series of previously validated experiments designed to assess framing effects and status quo bias in a sample of public and private sector managers. Our results indicate that public managers are not more risk averse or anchored to the status quo than their private sector counterparts; in fact, the findings suggest the opposite may be true under some conditions.   In addition, our results fail to confirm previous findings in the literature suggesting that public service motivation is associated with risk aversion. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of these results for the study of risky choice in the public sector and for modern public management reforms.

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Since Huntington’s seminal work The Soldier and the State, the scholarship on civil–military relations in the American context has often emphasized the need for a professional military to maintain an apolitical stance and let the civilian principals lead. In this article, we ask, what can we learn about civil-military relations by seeking to better understand the relationship between political institutions and the politicization of the military? We argue that this literature insufficiently accounts for the perils that exist within separation of powers (i.e., presidential) systems. Consequently, the existing scholarship cannot distinguish when politicization happens because of or despite civilian principals. We use long-standing arguments from Comparative Politics to explain why problems of separation of powers systems are endemic to these institutions. We then present five questions and two examples to facilitate a theoretical reframing of the subject. Our argument suggests more work is needed to understand how American political institutions shape civil–military relations.