In the early 21st century quite a few social scientists and scholars in the humanities are arguing that we should pay more attention to things material. For, as they say, not only humans act but so, too, do materials. Joining this discussion, in this paper we will use the case of omega-3 fatty acids to address the questions of how materials may act; in which ways this is relevant; and what is linked up with it. Hence, we will come to speak about research in prisons where inmates were badly nourished; fish being caught in the Global South for Scandinavian fish pills; and the urgency of shifting from the verb 'to act' to a differentiated list of modes of doing. Learning from the natural sciences, we will argue, requires that their methods and concerns be carefully attended to. Taking matters seriously comes with the obligation of tracing where such matters come from and where they go. And talking about 'action', finally, demands that, beyond liberal notions of isolated individual actors, it be creatively retheorised.

Emerging from the question of how to live together with our planet, more-than-human approaches to interspecies relations have often presented ‘cozy’ versions of conviviality (Whatmore 2002; Haraway 2008; Hinchliffe 2010). This was usually set against a (supposedly) exclusionary politics of nature, in a move that betrayed a still largely humanist ethics. From the focus on friendly companions, to the attention to practices of care or living-together, the notion of companion species and their entanglements with humans has been polarized towards a pleasant and ‘nice’ version of coexistence. But, dealing with composting, it becomes clear that relations with the environment are never so neat and clean. What are, then, the modes of being together with the ‘dirty’ side of the ‘green’? What practices emerge at the mundane interstices of the ‘big picture’ of a functional ecology? Wasting, eating, rotting, consuming, transforming and becoming-with are brought together in a variety of ways in practices of composting-with earthworms. Reporting on our own and others' attempts to ‘live-together’ with earthworms, this paper tracks the non-relations and asymmetries of the transformations of more-than-human materialities inside (and outside) domestic composting bins. We argue that the example of living-together with dung earthworms sheds light on the interplays between attachment and detachment (Candea 2010), shifting the notion of conviviality from a green and comfortable ‘democratic collective’ (Latour 2004) to a messy, yet constantly productive and on-going coexistence.

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You say I and you are proud of this little word. But greater than your word is your body which does not say I but performs I. -Friedrich Nietzsche 1 Bodies are both Zombies and Cyborgs. We have never had a mind of our own and we often perform involuntary -conditioned and externally prompted. Ever since we evolved as hominids and developed bipedal locomotion, two limbs became manipulators and we constructed artifacts, instruments and machines. In other words we have always been coupled with technology. We fear the involuntary and we are becoming increasingly automated and extended. But we fear what we have always been and what we have already become -Zombies and Cyborgs. -Stelarc 2 D uring the last three or four decades, the Australian-based performance artist Stelarc has been experimenting with the body, mapping its limits and probing its potentials in what are often perceived as thought-provoking and spectacular performances and projects. Pushing the body to its biological and architectural limits, the early suspension events explored the boundaries of the skin, seeing the body neither as object nor subject but rather as transformable and evolutionary matter in flux. Stelarc then went on to his prosthesis performances through his Third Hand. Here, the focus was rather on the possibilities of technology and media in conjunction and symbiosis with the body as an evolutionary and architectural being. In Ping Body and Parasite the body was suspended once again, but this time in a network of information and communication with absent agencies. The body performed involuntarily through a series of voltage-in and voltage-out impulses, creating choreographies of decentred, split, and fractal bodies. These performances of the body becoming in mutual symbiosis and emergence with its technological milieu radically question transcendental notions of the agency of the bounded self and traditional Euclidian conceptions of spatial configurations: 'Electronically connected and coupled bodies can extrude agency with a at NANYANG TECH UNIV LIBRARY on May 30, 2015 cgj.sagepub.com Downloaded from

Recent papers by prominent scholars in science and technology studies (notably John Law and Bruno Latour) have crystallized a fundamental disagreement about the scope and purpose of intervention in actor-network theory or what we here choose to bracket as empirical philosophy. While the precept of agnostic description is taken as a given, the desired effects of such descriptions are highly debated: Is the goal to interfere with the singularity of the real through the enactment of multiple and possibly conflicting ontologies? Or is it (also) to craft new and comprehensive common worlds supported by notions of due process and parliamentary procedure? In this paper we think about this disagreement as a question of research strategy (a normative discord about the desirable outcome of an intervention) in order to assess its implications for research tactics (a descriptive accord about the practical crafting of an adequate account). A key point here is to challenge the impermeability of such a division and show how the strategic dispute, if to be taken seriously, invariably spills over to swamp the level of tactics. To illustrate this point, we draw upon materials from our recent doctoral research projects and to facilitate the discussion we make two deliberate caricatures: Firstly, we operate with a simplified history of actor-network theory in which a strategy of epistemological critique has been replaced by two contending agendas for ontological intervention. Secondly, we address these two contending agendas as distinct options which map on to the positions of our two main interlocutors. In doing so, it becomes possible to compare their respective tactical implications as we work through two examples of what might constitute an empiricist intervention.