High-Voltage Direct Current (HVDC) merchant transmission lines allow trade across separate power markets and often in different countries. Flows on existing cross-border lines are often assessed as suboptimal, which may be due to the light regulation that often prevails in these cases. This paper studies the impact of market power on HVDC interconnections as a determinant of imperfect arbitrage. We assess the impact of Physical Transmission Rights (PTRs) allocation on the management of an HVDC interconnection between a thermal and a hydroelectricity market, assuming dynamic water management. We use a two-stage game formulated as an Equilibrium Problem with Equilibrium Constraints (EPEC) to model the strategic trade between the New York (US) and Quebec (Canada) systems. The numerical model is calibrated with public data. We find that although the interconnection can create wealth, a high concentration of PTRs can destroy value because of dumping strategies. The impact of trade on local price levels may be of concern and calls for the functional unbundling of traders and generators.

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Concerns about climate change have spurred governments to reduce carbon emissions by supporting adoption of renewable energy (RE) technologies. Due to the intermittent and location-specific nature of RE technologies, energy storage has become important because it could be used to smooth out temporal disparities in residual demand. Thus, carbon policy has made storage-enabled RE generation more critical to the power sector, and this enhanced position could be exploited by firms to exert market power. Using an equilibrium model, we examine the implications of policy interventions and technological change on the marginal value of energy storage in a power market with RE and thermal generation. In particular, we specify the market conditions under which RE producers with storage strategically shift deployment of their resource to the off-peak period and outline its implications for the marginal value of RE storage. Moreover, we find that even pricetaking RE producers may actually increase off-peak RE production as storage efficiency increases. Consequently, the RE producer's profit decreases with storage efficiency, which conflicts with the social objective of improving storage efficiency. These private and social incentives can be better aligned via a carbon tax, however. Hence, our results may inform the regulatory process governing market design of a power sector with increasing capacities of RE generation and storage.