Zero-knowledge proofs are mathematical cryptographic methods to demonstrate the validity of a claim while providing no further information beyond the claim itself. The possibility of using such proofs to process classified and other sensitive physical data has attracted attention, especially in the field of nuclear arms control. Here we demonstrate a non-electronic fast neutron differential radiography technique using superheated emulsion detectors that can confirm that two objects are identical without revealing their geometry or composition. Such a technique could form the basis of a verification system that could confirm the authenticity of nuclear weapons without sharing any secret design information. More broadly, by demonstrating a physical zero-knowledge proof that can compare physical properties of objects, this experiment opens the door to developing other such secure proof-systems for other applications.

The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons requires States Parties to designate a "competent international authority or authorities" for negotiating and verifying the irreversible elimination of nuclear-weapons programs. Ensuring that such an authority or authorities is able to be fit for purpose when required to meet these tasks will be crucial for both the future implementation and legitimacy of the Treaty. To address this challenge, this article proposes the early creation of a two-part organizational structure, comprising an implementation support unit and a dedicated scientific and technical advisory body, to begin the process of institutionalizing the treaty, and build the technical basis for meeting its verification goals should a nuclear-weapon-possessing state decide to join. The article then discusses how such two-part structure could be scaled-up as a standing international organization tasked with the coordination of an ad hoc inspectorate, which would also cooperate and complement the work of existing nuclear verification organizations, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency. This evolutionary and adaptive strategy to institution building could empower the new Treaty by supporting the emergence of a new regime complex for nuclear disarmament, while taking into account the initially limited financial and technical resources of its member states.

She agreed that outside laboratory results are not acceptable, unless certain conditions are met. She cited many standards (5.15.2.2, 5.13.5, 1.11, 4.1, 4.2.2, and 4.3 2 ) that apply to the computer crossmatch in our situation. She stated that in terms of a historic record the results would have had to have been confirmed at the time of collection using two independent identifiers. Also in terms of the outside laboratory, the testing shall be performed in a laboratory certified by CMS and registered with the FDA, if indicated, by 21CFR. Testing or services required by these blood banking and transfusion services standards shall be performed in a laboratory accredited by the AABB or equivalent accrediting body. Also the outside facility must have a medical director who is a licensed physician. This director will provide consultative and support services that relate to the care and safety of donor and/or transfusion recipients.We interpreted the FDA response as all but prohibiting the practice of accepting ABO Rh results performed at outside institutions and manually entering them into the hospital database and the AABB response as a shade more nuanced, but essentially shedding significant doubt as to the acceptability of the practice. We recommend that historical information from outside laboratories not be utilized as part of compatibility testing and that two separate ABO Rh determinations be performed at the transfusing institution for crossmatch testing by any method, including, but not limited to, the computer crossmatch. This will ensure compliance with accrediting and regulating bodies and reduce the consequences of WBIT.