The tendency to leave and the actual number of people leaving Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) has been increasing in the last few years. We investigate the main determinants of people leaving BiH, with special focus on youth. Using the newest available data from USAID's National Survey of Citizens Perceptions from 2017, we investigate this issue by using probit regressions. Attitudes and perceptions related to emigration from BiH are compared between two groupsyouth up to the age of 30 and the rest of respondents. The analysis includes socio-demographic characteristics of respondents, their sentiment and satisfaction with life conditions, public services and government. The results imply that young respondents (under the age of 30) are more likely to consider leaving the country than older ones (above the age of 30). The results also show a significant positive effect of dissatisfaction with public services and high level of corruption on tendency to leave the country. The estimation of interaction effects imply that corruption is more prominent reason for emigration among youth than older respondents. Hence, the main issues which should be addressed to stop the trend of emigration are the improvement in the quality of public services and reduction in corruption.

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Highlights The paper is comparing the effect of currency board arrangements with other monetary/exchange rate regimes on the credibility of the monetary authority  Answers to survey question about the expectations about the local currency stability are used as an indicator of the credibility of monetary authority  The results suggest a positive effect of CBA on monetary author's credibility  Additionally, the results imply that the positive effect of currency boards is greater the worse the expectations about economic prospects and the lower the trust in government AbstractCurrency Boards are usually argued to increase the credibility of the monetary authority, although this effect ultimately depends on the economic, political and institutional circumstances in the specific country. Few studies have previously been able to address this issue empirically. Using a novel database, the analysis conducted in this paper finds that, other things being equal, the credibility of the monetary authority is likely to be higher in those European transition countries with currency board arrangements, namely Bosnia and Herzegovina and Bulgaria. The results also suggest that currency board arrangements are more likely to increase the credibility of the monetary authority in countries with a low level of trust in government and a weak economy. These findings imply that the maintenance of currency board arrangements in recent years in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Bulgaria may have been advantageous.

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