No abstract

No abstract

Hydro-hegemons can provide both positive and negative forms of leadership, the former leading to cooperative outcomes and the latter to conflict in transboundary river basins. What constrains hydro-hegemons and under what conditions do they cooperate? This paper examines China's and India's hydro-hegemonic behavior, using case studies of the Mekong and the Ganges, respectively. As a positive hydro-hegemon, China cooperates multilaterally with other Mekong riparians, while India takes a limited sovereignty view by sharing water with Bangladesh and Nepal in the Ganges. China and India behave as dominant hydro-hegemons when they engage in resource capture strategies, such as water diversion projects and unilateral dam-building activities. The regional context and domestic politics of hydro-hegemons constrain their behavior, and determine the forms of positive and negative leadership they provide. When strong multilateral mechanisms already exist in the regional context, hydro-hegemons are more likely to cooperate multilaterally. This explains why China cooperates multilaterally in the Mekong while India rejects multilateralism in the Ganges. Domestic considerations also explain why China cooperates multilaterally in the Mekong but avoids water-sharing discussions. In India's case, electoral politics account for the eventual signing of the Ganges and Mahakali treaties after decades of negotiations.

China's increasing material capabilities stand at the heart of the US—China power transition debate. The focus on material power reflects a realist definition of power based on the possession of resources. However, material capabilities do not necessarily translate into influence and do not always determine outcomes. Non-material power matters at least as much as material capabilities. This article argues that China under President Xi Jinping views power differently from previous generations of Chinese leaders. While material power remains important, Xi has paid greater attention to strengthening Chinese non-material power, in particular structural power and discursive power. This article examines Chinese structural and discursive power, the third and fourth faces of power, through the lens of Xi's mega-infrastructure vision, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). It argues that power, both material and non-material, is embedded in infrastructure. Specifically, the article uses case-studies of Chinese construction of high-speed railways in Laos and Indonesia to illustrate the effects of Chinese structural and discursive power. Based on field work and in-depth interviews, the cases show that China is relatively successful in wielding structural and discursive power in Laos and Indonesia, despite the differences in the two countries' political systems, and economic and population sizes. Chinese domination, however, does not mean that subordinate states do not have agency. For instance, there is resistance against the narrative of a pre-eminent Chinese civilization in Chinese discourse, as the Indonesia case demonstrates. Exploring the different facets of Chinese power is critical for a proper understanding of how China strives to shape the structure and discourse of the global order.

Neuroanaesthesia is an expanding specialty that requires a good understanding of neurophysiology as well as the pathophysiology of raised intracranial pressure. Neuroanaesthetists need to ensure neurosurgical patients maintain an adequate cerebral perfusion pressure intraoperatively, whist providing optimum operating conditions. To achieve this, a balanced anaesthetic technique preventing hypertensive surges and optimizing cerebral venous drainage by careful patient positioning is important. Knowledge of the therapeutic options available to the anaesthetist for decreasing ICP intraoperatively is essential. As neurosurgery evolves, it provides neuroanaesthetists with new challenges including awake craniotomies, stereotactic neurosurgery and intraoperative MRI.