Being excluded and ignored has been shown to threaten fundamental human needs and cause pain. Such reflexive reactions to social exclusion have been conceptualized as direct and unmoderated (temporal need threat model of ostracism). Here, we propose an extension and argue that reflexive reactions depend on how social exclusion situations are construed. If being excluded is understood as a violation of an inclusion norm, individuals will react with pain and threat. In contrast, if being excluded is consistent with the prevailing norm, the exclusion situation is interpreted as less threatening, and negative reflexive reactions to ostracism should be attenuated. Four studies empirically support this conceptual model. Studies 3 and 4 further show that to guide situated construal, the norm has to be endorsed by the individual. In both Studies 1 and 3, the effect of the norm is mediated by the objective situation's subjective construal.

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The current research investigates how facial appearance can act as a cue that guides observers' feelings and moral judgments about social exclusion episodes. In three studies, we manipulated facial portraits of allegedly ostracized persons to appear more or less warm and competent. Participants perceived it as least morally acceptable to exclude a person that appeared warm-and-incompetent. Moreover, participants perceived it as most acceptable to exclude a cold-and-incompetent looking person. In Study 2, we also varied the faces of the excluding group (i.e., the ostracizers). Results indicate that typical ostracizers are imagined as cold-and-incompetent looking. Study 3 suggests that the effect of a target's facial appearance on moral judgment is mediated by feelings of disgust. In sum, people's moral judgment about social exclusion can be influenced by facial appearance, which has many implications in intergroup research, such as for bystander intervention.

Ostracism, excluding and ignoring others, results from a variety of factors. Here, we investigate the effect of personality on the likelihood of becoming a target of ostracism. Theorizing that individuals low in conscientiousness or agreeableness are at risk of getting ostracized, we tested our hypotheses within five pre-registered studies: Four experiments investigating participants' willingness to ostracize targets characterized by different personality traits and a reverse correlation face modelling study where we determined and subsequently validated the stereotypical face of an ostracized person. A survey study within a representative German data panel further corroborated our findings. In line with our hypotheses, persons low in conscientiousness or agreeableness provoke more ostracism intentions (Studies 1, 2, and 4), are more likely to be actually ostracized by others (Study 3), represent the stereotype of an "ostracizable" person (Study 5), and report experiencing more ostracism (Study 6). Effects remained stable even after controlling for likeability of the target (Study 2 and 4). Moreover, being described as negative on one personality dimension could not be compensated by being described as positive on the other (Study 4). In exploratory analyses, we further investigated the effects of openness to experience, neuroticism and extraversion. In sum, we find evidence that personality affects the likelihood of becoming a target of ostracism, and that especially low agreeableness and conscientiousness represent risk factors.

When observing an ostracism episode, observers may wish to know whether ostracism is justified or not. If ostracism appears unjustified, observers will likely blame the sources and sympathize with the target; if it appears justified, observers will likely blame and devalue the target. Here we introduce the "social dissimilarity rule," which holds that observers base their moral judgments on dissimilarities between the members of the observed group. In five studies, participants either recalled observed ostracism episodes or observed group interactions in which one group member was ostracized (e.g., in a chat or a group-working task). Results show that if similar persons exclude a dissimilar target (target is an "odd-one-out"), observers attribute ostracism to malicious motives of the ostracizers, such as ingroup favoritism, and devalue the ostracizers. However, if ostracism cannot be explained by social dissimilarity between the sources and the target, observers assume that the target is being punished for a norm deviation (punitive motive) and devalue the target. Use of the social dissimilarity rule was neither moderated by cognitive load (Study 3) nor by the perceived essentiality of the group distinction (Study 4). But if participants knew that the target previously deviated from a norm, knowledge about the situation had a stronger effect on moral judgments (Study 5) than social dissimilarity. These findings further our understanding of how observers make moral judgments about ostracism, which is important given that an observer's moral judgment can strongly impact bystander behavior and thus target recovery and well-being. (PsycINFO Database Record