In 2002, seven parents were taken to the criminal court in Dicle, a town in the province of Diyarbakır, for giving Kurdish names to their children 1. According to the prosecutor's claim, these names were the code names used by militants of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), and, therefore, were against the Civil Registration Law, which stipulated that names which do not conform to national culture, moral norms, customs and traditions and which offend the public could not be given to children. The case was brought to the attorney's attention by the Diyarbakır gendarmerie, which investigated the records at the Registration Office and came up with a list of Kurdish names after the Ministry of the Interior sent a secret circular, warning local administrators about an increase in Kurdish naming. 2 Ironically, the court was presided over by a female judge with a Kurdish name, Şirvan. During the hearings, the prosecutor drew attention to a report sent from the Turkish Language Society, stating that the names 'did not conform to Turkish naming habits.' In fact, some of the names in the list, such as Serhat and Baran were commonly used in Turkey. The families' attorney underlined that the prosecutor did not have the right to bring name annulment cases to court. In the end, the judge recognized the attorney's claim and dismissed the case due to procedural reasons. 3

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This article analyzes the exercise of state authority in Kurdish areas in the early Turkish Republic and discusses the state's ineffectiveness in dominating these areas. It argues that the mere existence of a highly ambitious social-engineering project, increased state presence in the region, and military power does not mean high levels of state capacity. Based on primary documents, this article discusses the problems of autonomy, coherence, and implementation that the Turkish state encountered in its nation-building project. It shows how the state's ideological rigidities and its shortage of resources and dedicated personnel undermined its capacity to control and shape the Kurdish areas. While the state attempted to regulate citizens’ private lives in Kurdish areas, the local society also tried to mold state employees in accordance with its own interests. A blurred boundary between the state and society was one of the unintended consequences of increased state presence in everyday life.

Why do some ethnic groups live peacefully with the states that govern them, whereas others develop into serious threats to state authority? Through a comparative historical analysis, this book compares the evolution of Kurdish mobilization in Turkey with the Berber mobilization in Morocco by looking at the different nation-building strategies of the respective states. Using a variety of sources, including archival documents, interviews, and memoirs, Senem Aslan emphasizes the varying levels of willingness and the varying capabilities of the Turkish and Moroccan states to intrude into their citizens' lives. She argues that complex interactions at the ground level-where states have demanded changes in everyday behavior, such as how to dress, what language to speak, what names to give children, and more mundane practicesaccount for the nature of emerging state-minority relations. By taking the local and informal interactions between state offi cials and citizens seriously, this study calls attention to the actual implementation of state policies and the often unintended consequences of these policies.

This chapter examines how different state actors in Turkey have used symbolic practices to govern and transform society. Based on examples largely drawn from the single party era (1923–1950) and the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government, it discusses three separate functions that symbolic practices serve. First, it analyzes the relationship between symbolic politics and legitimation of state authority and ideology. Second, it focuses on how symbolic politics can be used for coercive purposes, signaling state power and omnipresence. Finally, it examines the state’s efforts to use symbolism for cooptation purposes, communicating the material benefits that it provides to citizens in exchange for political support. Calling attention to unintended consequences, the chapter underlines how symbols usually generate contention and become a means of struggle between the state and dissident political movements. In the Turkish context, extensive use of symbolic politics has created hardened political identities, curtailing meaningful deliberation and undermining common norms. The Turkish example shows that symbolic politics can exacerbate political polarization by sharpening cultural contestation and invoking strong emotions in society.