A covert channel can occur when an attacker finds and exploits a shared resource that is not designed to be a communication mechanism. A network covert channel operates by altering the timing of otherwise legitimate network traffic so that the arrival times of packets encode confidential data that an attacker wants to exfiltrate from a secure area from which she has no other means of communication. In this paper, we present the first public implementation of an IP covert channel, discuss the subtle issues that arose in its design, and present a discussion on its efficacy. We then show that an IP covert channel can be differentiated from legitimate channels and present new detection measures that provide detection rates over 95%. We next take the simple step an attacker would of adding noise to the channel to attempt to conceal the covert communication. For these noisy IP covert timing channels, we show that our online detection measures can fail to identify the covert channel for noise levels higher than 10%. We then provide effective offline search mechanisms that identify the noisy channels.
We describe a secure network virtualization framework that helps realize the abstraction of Trusted Virtual Domains (TVDs), a security-enhanced variant of virtualized network zones. The framework allows groups of related virtual machines running on separate physical machines to be connected together as though there were on their own separate network fabric and, at the same time, helps enforce crossgroup security requirements such as isolation, confidentiality, security, and information flow control. The framework uses existing network virtualization technologies, such as Ethernet encapsulation, VLAN tagging, and VPNs, and combines and orchestrates them appropriately to implement TVDs. Our framework aims at automating the instantiation and deployment of the appropriate security mechanism and network virtualization technologies based on an input security model that specifies the required level of isolation and permitted network flows. We have implemented a prototype of the framework based on the Xen hypervisor. Experimental evaluation of the prototype shows that the performance of our virtual networking extensions is comparable to that of the standard Xen configuration.
Virtual data centers allow the hosting of virtualized infrastructures (networks, storage, machines) that belong to several customers on the same physical infrastructure. Virtualization theoretically provides the capability for sharing the infrastructure among different customers. In reality, however, this is rarely (if ever) done because of security concerns. A major challenge in allaying such concerns is the enforcement of appropriate customer isolation as specified by high-level security policies. At the core of this challenge is the correct configuration of all shared resources on multiple machines to achieve this overall security objective.To address this challenge, this paper presents a security architecture for virtual data centers based on virtualization and Trusted Computing technologies. Our architecture aims at automating the instantiation of a virtual infrastructure while automatically deploying the corresponding security mechanisms. This deployment is driven by a global isolation policy, and thus guarantees overall customer isolation across all resources. We have implemented a prototype of the architecture based on the Xen hypervisor.
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