We measure satisfaction about experimental outcomes, personal and other participants' behaviour after a multiperiod "hybrid contribution" multiplayer prisoner's dilemma called the "vote with the wallet" game. Our work shows that participants who cooperated above median (which we define as strong cooperators) are significantly more satisfied with the game in proportion to their cooperative choice. On the contrary, their satisfaction for the other players' behavior is negatively correlated with the extent of their own cooperative behavior and the non-cooperative behavior of the latter. The satisfaction of strong cooperators for their behavior in the game depends in turn on the share of their own cooperative choices. We document that a broader utility function including heterogeneity in expectations on other players' behavior, other-regarding preferences, and a negative reciprocity argument may account for the combination of the observed experimental and satisfaction findings.

Persuasion can be considered as a situation where subjects having an opinion or an argument are willing to change it in favor of others' proposal only if the new message has personal relevance and significant consequences on their lives. In this paper, we argue that improvements in the information set and the knowledge of the fundamental rules of a "well-formed formula" are necessary to minimize errors when people make their choices. Arguments can be manipulated either in terms of the truth of premises or in terms of the logical connectives among propositions. The emerging mechanism of the so-called fact-checking, used to verify candidates' statements during the electoral campaign, may be a very useful instrument to realize these improvements in political debates.

In this paper, we devise a slightly modified version of the vote with the wallet game used by Becchetti et al. [L. Becchetti and F. Salustri, The vote with the wallet as a multiplayer prisoner’s dilemma, CEIS Tor Vergata Research Paper No. 359, Vol. 13, Issue 10, Centre for Economic and International Studies, Rome, Italy (2015); L. Becchetti, V. Pelligra and F. Salustri, Testing for heterogeneity of preferences in randomized experiments: A satisfaction-based approach applied to multiple prisoner dilemmas, Appl. Econ. Lett. 24(10) (2017) 722–726] for the use of social media, where the player decides whether to responsibly share social knowledge or not. We follow the point of view of Bennet and Bennet [D. Bennet and A. Bennet, Social learning from the inside out: The creation and sharing of knowledge from the mind/brain perspective, in Social Knowledge: Using Social Media to Know What You Know, eds. J. P. Girard and J. L. Girard (IGI Global, 2011), pp. 1–23] according to which another social settings may emerge through the so-called “process of collaborative entanglement.” In this environment, members of a community interact continuously with strong emotional feelings to combine the sources of knowledge and the beneficiaries of that knowledge and move toward a common direction. The application of the model to the quantum game theory substantially confirms that the cooperative strategy becomes the optimal one depending on the frequency of interactions and people’s cultural, geographical and social reachability and traceability.

Cooperation is usually stronger towards in-group members, because giving an upright signal about themselves implies higher possibilities of reciprocity among members with the same social identity. We examine the case where collaboration between two groups is a mandatory condition to achieve success in a particular project, but in the first one, the social identity is quite strong. We show that the existence of a small share of prosocial players in the first group can create a sort of "imitation effect" so that each new member puts more effort in cooperating with the outsiders. On the other side, to avoid free-riding effort should be conditional to the other's commitment. This way to boost cooperation is usually more efficient than a coercive strategy in the presence of significant sized majorities or feelings of resentments. Our analysis suggests that it is appropriate, under some circumstances, to stimulate a multicultural paradigm devoted to value and manage diversity through an acculturation process emphasizing adaptation, interdependence, and mutual appreciation of different cultures.