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The article considers the recent legislative changes that allow the extension of the notion of an obligation as a relative relationship. Based on judicial practice and the positions of well-known jurists, the author comes to the conclusion that an obligation does not only connect the debtor with the creditor, but also generates passive duty for all the subjects of law to refrain from creating obstacles to the creditor in the exercise of its subjective rights. Meanwhile a creditor has the right to protect subjective rights from violations not only on the part of the debtor but also on the part of any third party. However, in a number of statutory cases, the creditor may be denied the opportunity to refer to the obligation in relations with third parties. Such legal consequences occur, in particular, in case of non-fulfillment of legislative requirements on the necessity of state registration of the contract, and in case of violation of the rules of the notification on the pledge of movables. The author proposes to refer to legal significance of relative relationship for third parties as an absolute legal force of obligations.

Introduction: the subject of the paper is the analysis of the concept of legal principles of the authoritative American jurist Ronald Dworkin, formulated by him in the essay “The Model of Rules” and formed the core of his initial challenge to the doctrine of legal positivism. The paper based on the general scientific and specific scientific methods pursues a dual goal – first, to systematize R. Dvorkin’s understanding of the specifics of legal principles and their consequences for the criticism of positivism, and second, to assess the potential of the author’s considered ideas outside of American-British law. Results: the paper summarizes the proposed R. Dworkin’s interpretation of legal principles as standards that differ from legal rules in terms of “logical and regulatory” parameters, the grounds for legalizing and significance in judicial justification, and also shows the connection of this interpretation with the negation of the key ideas of positivism. At the same time, it is noted both an unconventional view of R. Dworkin for the domestic jurisprudence and legal practice, the otherness of the criteria for understanding and specification of legal principles, and the insufficiency of a number of the author’s statements. Conclusions: on the one hand, the paper states the “weakness” of the arguments of R. Dworkin’s explanation of the grounds for legalizing the principles and their strict opposition to the rules; on the other hand, it emphasizes the value of these arguments for explaining the “weight” of the principles and conflicts between them, for understanding the procedures for restricting the fundamental rights, etc., which makes it necessary and possible to further develop the concept of the American jurist, including taking into account the experience of continental and Russian law.

The article includes a review of the research of a problematic historical and theoretical reconstruction of genesis and development of legal language analysis methodology proposed by Herbert Hart, a notable British legal expert. In the first part the author describes the philosophical basis of the Hart’s methodological concept (1949-1961) and defends a conclusion that analytical linguistic philosophy played a key part in its formation. The author affirms J.L. Austin’s key impact and intermediating secondary L. Wittgenstein’s influence on Hart. He mentions broad sources of Hart’s “open texture” concept that cannot be boiled down to F. Waismann’s views. The second part is focused on Hart’s ascriptivism and withdrawal ability concept (1949). Its contradictions include syncretism of withdrawal ability senses and social concept ascriptivity, as well as a rigid link between “action” and “responsibility” concepts. The paper emphasises va­lue of the concept for formation of Hart’s legal methodology concept. The third part represents a study of Hart’s analytical law project (1950s) considered as a philo­sophical explanation of basic legal concepts related to “abnormal” legal language idea and appropriate method of “philosophical determination”. The latter is interpreted as a central exemplary method for Hart’s techniques of conceptual analysis in view of problematization of semantics-pragmatics relationship. The author reviews Hart’s discussions with J. Cohen, E. Bodenheimer and L. Fuller about analytical law consistency, records significance of their arguments and notes further transformation of the Hart’s concept into conventional legal science. The fourth part presents analysis of the treatise (1961) methodology as an analytical law and descriptive sociology research. Hart’s analysis of a law concept related to taxonomisation of cen­tral and borderline cases of its use is interpreted as an example of application of previously formed techniques intended for analysis of multivalent, open and compound concepts. The author mentions merits and demerits of Hart’s approach. At the same time, he proves a thesis concerning lack of necessary relationship between philosopher’s methodology and posi­tivistic legal consciousness.

This article explores the doctrine of indeterminacy (or openness) of legal concepts set out in the early essay by the British philosopher and jurist Herbert Hart The Ascription of Responsibilities and Rights (1949). The main content and specificity of such doctrine of indeterminacy as well as its place in the overall 1949 conception of ascriptivism and defeasibility are unfolded. In this form H. Hart’s early doctrine of indeterminacy is compared with his later views, primarily with the doctrine of «open structure» of legal terms and rules expressed in his 1961 treatise The Concept of Law. In the article one draws a conclusion about a continuity of Hart’s early and classical views on legal language and methodology of its explanation, and points to their common philosophical basis as well as to a greater universality and jurisprudential orientation of 1961 indeterminacy doctrine 1961 centure.