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The paper finds out that the increased incentive structures under the ENP and the more intense socialization dynamics in which Eastern ENP countries have been brought in since the launch of the ENP are not reflected into their regime patterns. However, on the long run (1991-2010) the EU democracy promotion in the region under consideration appears to be largely consistent. In addition, a content analysis of Progress Reports released by the European Commission on the implementation process of ENP Action Plans (ENPAPs) reveals that most Eastern partners have considered in their reform agendas the democracy-related objectives of these documents and that some have also sought to adopt international democratic instruments as provided for in the ENPAPs.Though the record is far from satisfactory on norm internalization, content analysis of Commission's Reports suggests that one should be cautious while totally sweeping away the EU's democratization role.

The institutions of patronage, clientelism and nepotism are resilient and obstruct political liberalisation and democratic consolidation. This paper draws on historical (neo)institutionalism, democratisation research and studies in economic history to understand the reproduction mechanisms of informal institutions in EU's Eastern neighbourhood, and to propose a policy response, which could have the potential to disrupt these mechanisms. Outsourcing national judiciary systems from EU's Eastern neighbourhood to external rule of law missions might offer one solution as long as they satisfy at least two conditions: (1) they need to have a targeted executive mandate; and (2) they must be deployed with the support of an authoritative international actor, such as the EU or UN, under conditions of concerted international efforts and significant financial assistance. Local actors might oppose this infringement of national sovereignty. External rule of law missions should therefore be proposed during a democratic transition when reformers rely on external support. Policy Implications • Outsourcing national judiciary systems to external rule of law missions, having a targeted executive mandate and the support of concerted international action, might prove to be one solution against the reproduction of informal institutions. • The EU could make use of EUROPOL, OLAF and other specialised bodies to identify, track, expose and combat the moneylaundering activities many patrons are involved into, while using EU firms, banks and offshore companies. Imposing targeted sanctions on such individuals can also be considered.

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