This article presents an original dataset of direct public funding (DPF) of political parties across 27 post-communist regimes from the outset of transition until 2020. It represents the first systematic, and detailed account of the actual level of DPF provided to parties outside established democracies in terms of geographical and temporal coverage. The dataset has a panel format and includes information on DPF per registered voter and cast ballot separately and in aggregate for more than 800 country-year observations and more than 200 election campaigns. The analysis unveils substantial cross-national and within-country variation in the level of DPF, as well as between statutory and election financing. Despite an increasing reliance of political parties on the state, no pattern exists regarding the dynamics of access and distribution rules. It also highlights the limitations and risks entailed by the extensive use of various proxies such as dichotomous indicators, composite regulatory indexes, or perception-based measures that do not capture cross-national and within-country variation either in DPF or other dimensions of political financing regime.

Does the provision of state subsidies to political parties reduce their involvement in corruption? Existing research provides inconclusive evidence on this relationship, perhaps because cross‐national studies on public funding and corruption are often limited by regulation‐based indexes of political financing and by very general corruption measures. In this study, we use focused measures for both phenomena to investigate whether more generous public funding reduces party corruption. Our independent variable reflects the actual cash amount of budgetary subventions provided to parties in twenty‐seven post‐communist countries. Our dependent variable of party‐centered corruption represents the share of firms considerably affected by the informal payments made by businesses to political parties and parliamentarians to influence their decisions. We find that a higher level of state subsidies is associated with a reduction in corruption; its effect diminishes as funding increases, and its impact on corruption is lagged. However, there is a wide interval of uncertainty around these results. In the context of the existing literature, our contribution reduces the estimate of the size of a public funding effect and increases the level of uncertainty.