This paper studies a new phenomenon, the ‘top to bottom’ corruption networks of organized crime, law enforcement and Government officials in Russia. We examine the Soviet roots of corruption and its transformation during transitional period. By focusing on contemporary Russian corruption networks this paper explores the complex of state-run oligarchic structure with established rates, well organized inter-institutional groups incorporated by common ideas of extracting profits. The danger is in the existence of extensive and stable corruption networks, which not only profit by their illegal activities between Organized Crime groups and Law Enforcements, but invest in further corrupt developments to control the government. We argue that corruption in Russia, for a long time, has been imbedded in the system of social relations and, by the majority of citizens, was not considered to be a crime. Presenting arguments against existing simplified understanding of corruption, this study elucidates corruption networks as an expansion of Organized Crime in all spheres of post-totalitarian Russia. It also shows that a magic circle of corruption closely intertwines with the inefficiency of power and the inefficiency of rule of law.

This study focuses on the development of persons and organizations in the successor states of the Soviet Union, with an emphasis on Russia. It examines the development of criminal professionalism in Russia between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries and argues that exiling peasants to Siberia contributed to the development of a criminal underworld and the creation of a professional criminal underclass. In the early to late Soviet periods, vory v zakone, or "thieves-in-law," evolved together with criminal groups as a means to survive in the GULAG, these criminal groups operating within the Soviet prisons and penal colonies. Inadequacies of the Soviet system of central planning led to the criminalization of the Soviet economy and the emergence of the thieves-in-law as critical players. Activities such as racketeering, robbery, and other crimes were dangerous but predominantly secondary. The roots of the Russian mafia lie in the innermost depths of the Russian shadow economy. Some of the key aspects of the post-Soviet privatization process are analyzed together with the interaction between various levels of the Russian government and organized crime groups. It is argued that the state was not corrupted by organized crime groups, but rather the organized crime groups became the state. In the new Russia, organized crime groups and corrupt government executives work together to generatea new criminal state.

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