Yearly estimates of urban and rural direct losses (excess deaths) from the 1932-34 famine are presented for the oblasts of Soviet Ukraine. Contrary to expectations, the highest losses are not found in the grain-producing southern oblasts, but in the north-central Kyiv and Kharkiv oblasts. Several hypotheses are proposed and tested to explain this finding. No single hypothesis provides a comprehensive explanation. Losses in some oblasts are due to specific factors, while losses in other oblasts seem to be explained by a combination of economic and political factors. Quantitative analyses are presented of resistance and Soviet repressions in 1932, and effects of the food assistance program and historical-political factors on direct losses in 1933 are analyzed.Keywords: 1932-33 famine losses by oblast; Holodomor; regional Holodomor losses; Ukrainian famine; urban and rural Holodomor losses. RésuméDes estimations annuelles de pertes (décès excédentaires) directement attribuables à la famine de 1932-34 sont présentées pour les zones urbaines et rurales d'Ukraine sovietique. Contrairement aux attentes, les pertes les plus importantes n'étaient pas dans la région méridionale productrice de grain, mais plutôt dans la région du nord-centre, soit Kiev et Kharkiv. Plusieurs hypothèses sont proposées et mises à l'épreuve pour vérifier cette conclusion. Cependant, aucune hypothèse, à elle seule, ne fournit une explication complète. Dans certaines régions, les pertes sont causées par des facteurs précis, alors que dans d'autres, les pertes sont expliquées par une combinaison de facteurs économiques et politiques. Des analyses quantitatives sont présentées sur la résistance et les répressions sovietiques en 1932. L'effet du programme d'assistance alimentaire et les facteurs politico-historiques attribuables directement aux pertes en 1933 est également analysé.

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The demise of world empires and the loss of colonies by the west European states is often viewed by students of nationalism 'as a central feature of the post-war Western European experience'. 1 The end of the Cold War resulted in the disintegration of the multinational Russian/Soviet empire and two 'pan-Slavic' states, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. In the case of Russia, the loss of empire was accompanied not only by loss of access to raw materials and markets and great damage to its prestige, as had been the case with the west European colonial powers, but also by military conflicts both beyond and within the Russian Federation.At the core of the differences between Russia and the west in dealing with the loss of empire lies the specific character of Russian imperialism, whose pecularities have been strongly manifested over the last two centuries. John Dunlop, who has written extensively on the 'loss' and 'fall' of the Soviet empire, 2 has also questioned the usage of the term 'empire' in regard to the tsarist state and the USSR. He writes that 'imprecise use of terminology serves to skew and to distort the position of Russians under both the Tsars and the Soviets'. 3 Richard Pipes, for his part, believes that the Russian empire acquired special characteristics owing to the fact that in Russia 'the rise of the national state and the empire occurred concurrently, and not, as in the case of the Western powers, in sequence'. 4 A number of specific characteristics distinguish Russian imperialism from the classical imperialisms of countries like Britain and France. These characteristics include the absence of Russian colonies overseas, active incorporation of the élites of the conquered borderlands into the Russian imperial élite, prevalence of empire-building tendencies over nation-building ones, employment of a federal façade for the highly centralized state of the Soviet period, etc. 5 Journal of Contemporary History

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“Getting history wrong is an essential factor in the formation of a nation,” wrote Ernest Renan, basing this observation on his analysis of the nation-building experience in nineteenth-century Europe (qtd. in Eric Hobsbawm,On History.New York: New York Press, 1997: 270; for a different translation of the same sentiment, see Ernest Renan, “What is a Nation,” inNationalism in Europe from 1815 to the Present: A Reader.Ed. Stuart Woolf. London: Routledge, 1996: 50). Many historians today tend to agree with Renan's statement and are doing their best to “get history right” as they search for alternatives to national history. More often than not they face an uphill battle in that regard, both within and outside their profession.