In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, many governments swiftly decided to order nationwide lockdowns based on limited evidence that such extreme measures were effective in containing the epidemic. A growing concern is that governments were given little time to adopt effective and proportional interventions protecting citizens’ lives while observing their freedom and rights. This paper examines the effectiveness of non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) in containing COVID-19, by conducting a linear regression over 108 countries, and the implication for human rights. The regression results are supported by evidence that shows the change in 10 selected countries’ responding strategies and their effects as the confirmed cases increase. We found that school closures are effective in containing COVID-19 only when they are implemented along with complete contact tracing. Our findings imply that to contain COVID-19 effectively and minimize the risk of human rights abuses, governments should consider implementing prudently designed full contact tracing and school closure policies, among others. Minimizing the risk of human rights abuses should be a principle even when full contact tracing is implemented.

Responsiveness and accountability constitute the process of democratic representation, reinforcing each other. Responsiveness asks elected representatives to adopt policies ex ante preferred by citizens, while accountability consists of the people's ex post sanctioning of the representatives based on policy outcomes. However, the regulatory literature tends to interpret responsiveness narrowly between a regulator and regulatees: the regulator is responsive to regulatees' compliance without considering broader public needs and preferences. Democratic regulatory responsiveness requires that the regulator should be responsive to the people, not just regulatees. We address this theoretical gap by pointing out the perils of regulatory capture and advancing John Braithwaite's idea of tripartism as a remedy. We draw out two conditions of democratic regulatory responsiveness from Philip Selznickcomprehensiveness and proactiveness. We then propose overlapping networked responsiveness based on indirect reciprocity among various stakeholders. This mechanism is the key to connecting regulatory responsiveness with accountability.

One reason that regulation is difficult is that repeated encounters between regulator and regulatee are rare. We suggest diplomacy as a model for reconfiguring regulatory institutions in response. Ambassadors for Regulatory Affairs who would be agents for all state regulatory agencies could be based in most large firms and small and medium enterprises that pose unusual regulatory risks. In rural towns, police would be trained as regulatory ambassadors. Just as a US Secretary of State can launch a “diplomatic surge” in Myanmar from 2009, so regulatory surges are possible in market sectors of high risk or high opportunity. We propose strategies of indirect reciprocity as a way in which reciprocity that is only episodic in these strategic ways can promote more general responsiveness. Indirect reciprocity is reciprocity that we do not personally experience, but learn from the experience of a culture. This means that so long as we sustain regulation as a relational as opposed to a purely technocratic process, indirect reciprocity might civilize regulatory compliance in an historical process informed by the theories of Elias and Putnam.

Cities are key in urban climate mitigation. Since the early 2000s, a trend of urban climate governance experimentation has been observed in which cities, and especially city governments, are trialing novel governance interventions, processes, and instruments to learn from their development and implementation. This article explores the role of the government of the city of Seoul, South Korea, in a range of local experiments. It particularly focuses on the factors that contribute to the success (or lack thereof) of urban climate governance experimentation. It finds that the city’s government has been successful in developing and trialing some but not all experiments and that the overall results of these are promising in certain areas of city development and use. The article also highlights some less promising results, indicating the fragile nature of urban climate governance experimentation—in both the scientific and political senses of the term.