We use supervisory data to investigate risk taking in the U.S. syndicated loan market at a time when longer-term interest rates are exceptionally low, and we study the ex-ante credit risk of loans acquired by different types of lenders, including banks and shadow banks. We find that insurance companies, pension funds, and, in particular, structured-finance vehicles take higher credit risk when investors expect interest rates to remain low. Banks originate riskier loans that they tend to divest shortly after origination, thus appearing to accommodate other lenders' investment choices. These results are consistent with a "search for yield" by certain types of shadow banks and, to the extent that Federal Reserve policies affected longer-term rates, the results are also consistent with the presence of a risk-taking channel of monetary policy. Finally, we find that longer-term interest rates have only a modest effect on loan spreads.

We provide a framework for assessing the build-up of vulnerabilities to the U.S. financial system. We collect forty-four indicators of financial and balance-sheet conditions, cutting across measures of valuation pressures, nonfinancial borrowing, and financial-sector health. We place the data in economic categories, track their evolution, and develop an algorithmic approach to monitoring vulnerabilities that can complement the more judgmental approach of most official-sector organizations. Our approach picks up rising imbalances in the U.S. financial system through the mid-2000s, presaging the financial crisis. We also highlight several statistical properties of our approach: most importantly, our summary measures of system-wide vulnerabilities lead the credit-to-GDP gap (a key gauge in Basel III and related research) by a year or more. Thus, our framework may provide useful information for setting macroprudential policy tools such as the countercyclical capital buffer.

The disappointingly slow recovery in the U.S. from the depths of the financial crisis once again focused attention on the relationship between financial frictions and economic growth. Some bankers and borrowers suggested that unnecessarily tight supervisory policies were a constraint on new lending that hindered the recovery. This paper explores one aspect of supervisory policy: whether the standards used to assign commercial bank CAMELS ratings have changed materially over time . Models incorporating time-varying parameters or economy-wide variables suggest that standards used in the assignment of CAMELS ratings over the post-crisis period generally were in line with historical experience. Indeed, each of the models used suggests that the variation in supervisory standards has been relatively small in absolute terms over most of the sample period. However, we show that when this measure of supervisory stringency becomes elevated, it has a noticeable dampening effect on lending activity in subsequent quarters.JEL Classification: G21, G28, L25