Despite recent advances in reasoning about concurrent data structure libraries, the largest implementations in java.util.concurrent have yet to be verified. The key issue lies in the development of modular specifications, which provide clear logical boundaries between clients and implementations. A solution is to use recent advances in fine-grained concurrency reasoning, in particular the introduction of abstract atomicity to concurrent separation logic reasoning. We present two specifications of concurrent maps, both providing the clear boundaries we seek. We show that these specifications are equivalent, in that they can be built from each other. We show how we can verify client programs, such as a concurrent set and a producer-consumer client. We also give a substantial first proof that the main operations of ConcurrentSkipListMap in java.util.concurrent satisfy the map specification. This work demonstrates that we now have the technology to verify the largest implementations in java.util.concurrent.

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Sensitive computations are now routinely delegated to thirdparties. In response, Confidential Computing technologies are being introduced to microprocessors, offering a protected processing environment, which we generically call an isolate, providing confidentiality and integrity guarantees to code and data hosted within-even in the face of a privileged attacker. Isolates, with an attestation protocol, permit remote third-parties to establish a trusted "beachhead" containing known code and data on an otherwise untrusted machine. Yet, the rise of these technologies introduces many new problems, including: how to ease provisioning of computations safely into isolates; how to develop distributed systems spanning multiple classes of isolate; and what to do about the billions of "legacy" devices without support for Confidential Computing?Tackling the problems above, we introduce Veracruz, a framework that eases the design and implementation of complex privacy-preserving, collaborative, delegated computations among a group of mutually mistrusting principals. Veracruz supports multiple isolation technologies and provides a common programming model and attestation protocol across all of them, smoothing deployment of delegated computations over supported technologies. We demonstrate Veracruz in operation, on private in-cloud object detection on encrypted video streaming from a video camera. In addition to supporting hardware-backed isolates-like AWS Nitro Enclaves and Arm ® Confidential Computing Architecture Realms-Veracruz also provides pragmatic "software isolates" on Armv8-A devices without hardware Confidential Computing capability, using the high-assurance seL4 microkernel and our IceCap framework.

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