Do stimuli appear to be closer when they are more threatening? We tested people's perceptions of distance to stimuli that they felt were threatening relative to perceptions of stimuli they felt were disgusting or neutral. Two studies demonstrated that stimuli that emitted affective signals of threat (e.g., an aggressive male student) were seen as physically closer than stimuli that emitted affective signals of disgust (e.g., a repulsive male student) or no affective signal. Even after controlling for the direct effects of physiological arousal, object familiarity, and intensity of the negative emotional reaction, we found that threatening stimuli appeared to be physically closer than did disgusting ones (Study 2). These findings highlight the links among biased perception, action regulation, and successful navigation of the environment.

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Past research shows that people like others who are similar to themselves, and that political partisans tend to dislike those with opposing viewpoints. Two studies examined how initial person impressions changed after discovering that the target held similar or dissimilar political beliefs. Using potential mates as targets, we found that participants liked targets less, were less romantically interested in targets, and rated targets as less attractive after discovering political dissimilarity with them. Further, they became more uncomfortable with targets after discovering ideological dissimilarity. Theoretical implications and suggestions for future research are discussed.

Anxiety leads to exaggerated perceptions of distance, which may impair performance on a physical task. In two studies, we tested one strategy to reduce anxiety and induce perceived proximity to increase performance. We predicted implementation intentions that reduce anxiety would increase perceived visual proximity to goal-relevant targets, which would indirectly improve performance. In two studies, we induced performance anxiety on a physical task. Participants who formed implementation intentions to reduce anxiety perceived goal-relevant targets (e.g., golf hole, dartboard) as physically closer and performed better than both participants without a strategy (Study 1) and participants with only a goal to regulate anxiety (Study 2). Furthermore, perceived proximity improved performance indirectly by increasing subjective task ease (Study 2). Results suggest that implementation intentions can reduce anxiety and lead to perceived proximity of goal-relevant targets, which helps perceivers make progress on goals.

We review a growing body of literature that evidences the reciprocal relationship between body and mind, known as embodied cognition. We argue that an embodied mind may serve a functional purpose, aiding in self-regulatory processes. Specifically, we suggest that embodied cognition assists in self-regulation by increasing signal strength, encouraging appropriate goal-relevant action, and incorporating situational constraints to cue appropriate information processing styles. Furthermore, we propose that affect serves as the link between an embodied mind and self-regulatory action. Finally, we situate this research in debates on theories of mind, and we advocate for a highly interactive system that integrates information across modalities. Body in Mind: The Role of Embodied Cognition in Self-RegulationWant to increase the amount of attention you can muster to slog through the Sunday morning New York Times crossword? Try sitting upright instead of the more likely and more popular slouched weekend position (Riskind & Gotay, 1982). Need help achieving that straight posture? Think of the last costume party for which you convincingly dressed as Martha Stewart or Donald Trump…or any other act, in which you consider yourself successful (Weisfeld & Beresford, 1982). Historically, proposing that motor and cognitive systems are active bedfellows may have seemed as curious as claiming the palatability of pickles with cheese or chocolate on crickets. Indeed, many traditional perspectives on how the mind works advocate for an isolated, encapsulated cognitive system (Fodor, 1983). They argue that cognition functions with little more than minimal influence from sources outside the higher-order cognitive system. However, mounting evidence suggests that the interaction between motor and cognitive systems is strong and pervasive. In this study, we review research that suggests that bodily movements, like head nodding and shaking, exert a powerful influence on cognition in seemingly unrelated, incompatible domains-and do so outside of awareness. Judgments and decisions once described as effortful, deliberate, or intentional may be influenced unknowingly by seemingly unrelated movements of the body. The relationship, however, is not unidirectional, as cognition can reciprocally influence the body.While evidence attesting to these bidirectional relationships mounts, only recently have researchers and theorists begun exploring the pressures that have created, and the consequences of, these connections. In this manuscript, we suggest one of many possible answers to these inquiries. We suggest that embodied cognition might serve a functional purpose by aiding in self-regulatory processes. We further propose that affect plays a critical role in this process; body movements can trigger affective responses, which in turn act as a cue that self-regulation is necessary or discretionary. We advocate for interactive motor and cognitive systems, and argue against an encapsulated, modular theory of mind.Social and Personality Psychology Compass 3/...