Conflict caused by wild herbivores damaging crops is an almost universal problem in conservation. We designed and implemented a game-theory-based system for supporting farmers whose crops were being heavily damaged by wild herbivores. In this communityoperated system, farmers self-report their production, which is endorsed by neighboring farmers. The average deficit in production is compensated for by a payment that is directly proportional to the average deficit in production of the group and to the individual farmer's productivity. As a result, farmers are compensated for the average damage (support) and rewarded for individual productivity (reward) (i.e., support cum reward [SuR]). The design of the game is such that only honest reporting gives maximum returns. Farmers who underreport receive less payment because the SuR amount is proportionate to their self-reported productivity. The endorsing farmers, in their own self-interest, prevent overreporting. The system involves multiple game situations, the combined result of which is a stable strategy based on honesty and hard work. In 2 villages along the western boundary of Tadoba Andhari Tiger Reserve in central India, we tested the system with 75 farmers over 6 crop seasons. After a few initial attempts to cheat, honesty prevailed throughout the group. Average crop productivity increased 2.5-fold, in spite of damage, owing to increased effort by farmers. Apart from wildlife conflict resolution, the model offers a promising alternative to crop insurance and a potential behavioral green revolution in agriculture. KEYWORDS crop insurance, evolutionary game theory, experimental socioeconomics, human-wildlife conflict, support cum rewardCombinación entre el Pago por Daños a Cultivos y la Recompensa por Productividad para Abordar el Conflicto con la Fauna Resumen: El conflicto causado por herbívoros silvestres que dañan los cultivos es casi un problema universal para la conservación. Diseñamos e implementamos un sistema basado en la teoría de juegos para apoyar a los agricultores cuyos cultivos estuvieran siendo dañados considerablemente por los herbívoros silvestres. En este sistema operado comunitariamente, los agricultores reportan por sí mismos su producción, la cual es endosada por los agricultores vecinos. El déficit promedio en la producción se compensa con un pago que es directamente proporcional al déficit promedio en la producción del grupo y a la productividad individual del agricultor. Como resultado, los agricultores son compensados por el daño promedio (apoyo) y recompensados por la productividad individual (recompensa) (es decir, apoyo con recompensa [SuR]). El diseño del juego es tal que solamente la declaración honesta otorga la máxima ganancia. Los agricultores que declaren menos de lo dañado reciben menor pago porque la cantidad SuR es proporcional a su productividad auto declarada. Los agricultores que los endosan, por interés propio, previenen que haya declaraciones por encima de lo realmente producido. El sistema involucra varias situaciones

We describe here the design, evolution and experimental implementation of a real life, game theory based system for supporting farmers suffering heavy crop damage by wild herbivores near protected areas. The system is community operated in which farmers self-report their produce, which is endorsed by neighbouring farmers. The average deficit in the productivity is compensated by an automated "support cum reward (SuR)" computation, which is directly proportional to the average productivity deficit of the group but also directly proportional to the individual farmer's produce. As a result, farmers are assured a 'support' against the average damage but at the same time a 'reward' for individual's productivity. The design of the game is such that only honest reporting gives maximum returns. An under-reporting farmer receives reduced benefit since the SuR amount is directly proportionate to his self-reported produce. If a farmer over-reports, other farmers of the community suffer a loss since the average deficit reduces. Therefore the endorsing farmers, for their own selfish interest, prevent over-reporting. The system involves multiple game situations, the combined result of which is expected to be a stable honest and hard worker strategy. A trial implementation with a group of 71 farmers over 6 cropping seasons showed that, after a few initial attempts to cheat, honesty prevailed in the entire group; the average crop productivity increased up to 2.5 fold, in spite of the risk of damage, owing to spontaneous increase in inputs by farmers. Apart from wildlife conflict resolution the model offers a promising alternative to crop insurance and a potential behavioural green revolution.