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In recent years, there has been a growth in scholarship on “nature‐based solutions” and “natural climate solutions” to climate change. A variety of actors have argued that these natural solutions—variously involving the protection, conservation, restoration, management, enhancement, or imitation of natural ecosystems—can play a crucial role in both mitigating and adapting to climate change. What is more, by virtue of their label, natural solutions promise to be particularly attractive to the public and policymakers and have received significant media and scholarly attention. But what is natural is also social: people, acting in various social groups, can selectively emphasize or deemphasize certain characteristics of climate solutions to make them seem more or less natural. The framing of particular solutions as “natural” or “unnatural” has far‐reaching implications for climate policy, but has thus far been overlooked. Here, we undertake a critical review of the ways in which natural solutions to climate change have been framed and examine the normative and practical implications of this framing. We review what counts (and what does not count) as a natural solution, and find that those labeled natural are routinely framed under technical and social appraisal criteria as being more beneficial, cost effective, mature, and democratic than ostensibly artificial counterparts. And yet we show that, under greater scrutiny, the natural framing obscures the reality that natural solutions can be just as risky, expensive, immature, and technocratic. We conclude by reflecting on the dangers of narrowing the range of solutions considered natural and indeed, of selecting solutions through recourse to “nature” at all. Rather, climate solutions must be evaluated in terms of their specific qualities, against a far broader range of framings. This article is categorized under: Social Status of Climate Change Knowledge > Knowledge and Practice

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Since the late 1970s, over 140 global environmental assessments (GEAs) have been completed. But are they any longer fit for purpose? Some believe not. Compelling arguments have been advanced for a new assessment paradigm, one more focussed on problem-solving than problem-identification. If translated into new assessment practices, this envisaged paradigm could prevail for the next several decades, just as the current one has since the late 1970s. In this paper, it is contended that the arguments for GEAs 2.0 are, in fact, insufficiently bold. Solutions-orientated assessments, often associated with a ‘policy turn’ by their advocates, are undoubtedly necessary. But without a ‘politics turn’ they will be profoundly insufficient: policy options would be detached from the diverse socio-economic explanations and ‘deep hermeneutics’ of value that ultimately give them meaning, especially given the very high stakes now attached to managing human impacts on a fast-changing planet. Here we make the case for GEAs 3.0, where two paradigmatic steps forward are taken at once rather than just one. The second step involves the introduction of political reasoning and structured normative debate about existential alternatives, a pre-requisite to strategic decision-making and its operational expression. Possible objections to this second step are addressed and rebutted. Even so, the case for politically-overt GEAs faces formidable difficulties of implementation. However, we consider these challenges less a sign of our undue idealism and more an indication of the urgent need to mitigate, if not overcome them. In a world of ‘wicked problems’ we need ‘wicked assessments’ adequate to them, preparatory to so-called ‘clumsy solutions’. This paper is intended to inspire more far-reaching debate about the future of GEAs and, by implication, about the roles social science and the humanities might usefully play in addressing global environmental change.

1Extreme event attribution (EEA) is a relatively new climate modeling methodology which 2 explores possible links between extreme weather events (such as heat waves, droughts, and 3 floods) and anthropogenic climate change. Such weather events are frequently depicted in the 4 media, which enhances the potential of EEA coverage to serve as a tool to communicate on-5 the-ground climate impacts to the general public. However, few academic papers have 6 systematically analyzed EEA's media representation. This paper helps to fill this literature 7 gap through a comprehensive analysis of media coverage of the 2011-2017 California 8 drought, with specific attention to the types of attribution and uncertainty represented. Results 9 from an analysis of five US media outlets between 2014 and 2015 indicate that the 10 connection between the drought and climate change was covered widely in both local and 11 national news. However, legitimate differences in the methods underpinning the attribution 12 studies performed by different researchers often resulted in a frame of scientific uncertainty 13 or disagreement in the media coverage. While this case study shows substantial media 14 interest in attribution science, it also raises important challenges for scientists and others 15 communicating the results of multiple attribution studies via the media. 16