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RESUME : Mon projet est de montrer qu'une meilleure comprehension de la position de Kant sur la valeur morale et sur le rdle de la compassion revele que les objections soulevees par les theoriciens contemporains de la psychologie morale et par les feministes ne sont pasfondees, et que la position de Kant sur ces questions nest pas du tout contre-intuitive. D'autres on deja soutenu que Kant accorde un role important a la compassion et que sa presence, pour lui, ne diminue pas la valeur morale des actions, maisje soutiens, plus positivement, que la presence de la compassion, pour Kant, est la marque d'une personne qui a progresse vers I'ideal, inaccessible etpourtant necessaire, de la vertu morale et que la personne ideale de Kant est quelqu'un qui agit par devoir et qui a developpe un sens aigu de la compassion.

Dissecting Bioethics "Dissecting Bioethics," edited by Tuija Takala and Matti Häyry, welcomes contributions on the conceptual and theoretical dimensions of bioethics. The section is dedicated to the idea that words defined by bioethicists and others should not be allowed to imprison people's actual concerns, emotions, and thoughts. Papers that expose the many meanings of a concept, describe the different readings of a moral doctrine, or provide an alternative angle to seemingly selfevident issues are therefore particularly appreciated. The themes covered in the section so far include dignity, naturalness, public interest, community, disability, autonomy, parity of reasoning, symbolic appeals, and toleration.

In recent years, the need for infant organs for transplantation has increased. There is a growing recognition of the potential use of anencephalics as sources of organs. Prevalent arguments defending the use of live anencephalics for organ sources are identified and criticized. I argue that attempts to deny the applicability of the "dead-donor rule" are either question-begging or based on false premises and that attempts to skirt the Kantian dictum against treating others as a means only are not successful. I contend that the apparent utilitarian justification for live anencephalics as organ sources is unsatisfactory for two reasons: first, because it ignores the undermining effect the policy would have on parental values and sentiments central to social welfare; and second, because attempts to respond adequately to the slippery slope argument against live anencephalic use are unconvincing.