Qualia, the individual instances of subjective conscious experience, are private events. However, in everyday life, we assume qualia of others and their perceptual worlds, to be similar to ours. One way this similarity is possible is if qualia of others somehow contribute to the production of qualia by our own brain and vice versa. To test this hypothesis, we focused on the mean voltages of event-related potentials (ERPs) in the time-window of the P600 component, whose amplitude correlates positively with conscious awareness. These ERPs were elicited by images of the international affective picture system in 16 pairs of friends, siblings or couples going side by side through hyperscanning without having to interact. Each of the 32 members of these 16 pairs faced one half of the screen and could not see what the other member was presented with on the other half. One stimulus occurred on each half simultaneously. The sameness of these stimulus pairs was manipulated as well as the participants’ belief in that sameness by telling subjects’ pairs that they were going to be presented with the same stimuli in two blocks and with different ones in the two others. ERPs were more positive at all electrode subsets for stimulus pairs that were  inconsistent with the belief than for those that were consistent. In the N400 time window, at frontal electrode sites, ERPs were again more positive for inconsistent than for consistent stimuli. As participants had no way to see the stimulus their partner was presented with and thus no way to detect inconsistence, these data might reveal an impact of the qualia of a person on the brain activity of another. Such impact could provide a research avenue when trying to explain the similarity of qualia across individuals.

We take what we see, hear, smell and feel for the reality. However, as neuroscientists, we know that this reality, that is, our perceptual world, is in fact made up by the brain from the processing of the nerve impulses coming from receptors. Ancient Greeks used to think that this perceptual world, sometimes called our 3D movie (Chalmers), is emitted and has its own physical nature. Given how real the 3D movie looks to us, it is still difficult today to consider that all we would be dealing with would be patterns of brain activity The present study thus aimed at testing whether the perceptual world could have some physical existence in addition to that of the neural patterns responsible for it. To achieve that goal, we tried to see whether brains could be sensitive to the 3D movie of others. This, admittedly unusual, operational hypothesis was based on two assumptions. First, brains are sensitive to the 3D movie, as our experience includes reactions to our perceptual world. Second, the physicality at stake does not differ across individuals. We recorded the event-related brain potentials (ERPs) evoked by stimuli of the international affective picture system in pairs of closely-related participants. Most importantly, they could neither see the stimuli simultaneously presented to their partners nor their reactions to them. As in Bouten et al. (2015), around 400 ms after the onset of the stimuli, ERPs started being more positive in inconsistent conditions. Namely, when the two subjects of each pair were presented with the same stimulus whereas they were told it would be a different one and vice-versa (i.e., different-stimuli expected to be same). ERPs were less positive when the two subjects of a pair were presented with the same stimuli and were told they were the same and conversely (i.e., different-stimuli expected to be different). The same experiment was then run in pairs of strangers. No significant effect of consistency on ERPs was observed even though participants could, this time, see, in the very periphery of their visual field, the reactions of their partner to the stimuli. We thus use the results of both studies to support a new version of the emission theory of consciousness and to suggest that the sensitivity to the perceptual world of others may depend on their prior familiarity with it.Preprints (www.preprints.org) | NOT PEER-REVIEWED | Posted:

Qualia, the individual instances of subjective conscious experience, are private events. However, in everyday life, we assume qualia of others and their perceptual worlds, to be similar to ours. One way this similarity is possible is if qualia of others somehow contribute to the production of qualia by our own brain and vice versa. To test this hypothesis, we focused on the mean voltages of event-related brain potentials (ERPs) in the time-window of the P600 component, whose amplitude correlates positively with conscious awareness. These ERPs were elicited by stimuli of the international affective picture system in 16 pairs of friends, siblings or couples going side by side through hyperscanning without having to interact. Each member of each pair faced one half of the screen and could not see what the other member was presented with on the other half. One stimulus occurred on each half simultaneously. The sameness of these two stimuli was manipulated as well as the participants' belief in that sameness. ERPs were more negative over left frontal sites and P600 amplitudes were minimal at midline sites when the two stimuli were, and were believed to be, different, suggesting that this belief could filter others' qualia. ERPs were less negative over left frontal sites and midline P600s were a bit larger when the two stimuli were, and were believed to be, the same, suggesting some mutual enrichment of the content of awareness in conditions of real and assumed similarity. When stimuli were believed to be the same but actually differed, P600s were greater over a large number of sites, suggesting greater enrichment in conditions of qualia difference and assumed similarity. P600s were also larger over many sites, when stimuli were believed to differ but were identical, suggesting that qualia similar to ours could pass the "believed-different filter".

Qualia, the individual instances of subjective conscious experience, are private events. However, in everyday life, we assume qualia of others and their perceptual worlds, to be similar to ours. One way this similarity is possible is if qualia of others somehow contribute to the production of qualia by our own brain and vice versa. To test this hypothesis, we focused on the mean voltages of event-related potentials (ERPs) in the time-window of the P600 component, whose amplitude correlates positively with conscious awareness. These ERPs were elicited by images of the international affective picture system in 16 pairs of friends, siblings or couples going side by side through hyperscanning without having to interact. Each of the 32 members of these 16 pairs faced one half of the screen and could not see what the other member was presented with on the other half. One stimulus occurred on each half simultaneously. The sameness of these stimulus pairs was manipulated as well as the participants’ belief in that sameness by telling subjects’ pairs that they were going to be presented with the same stimuli in two blocks and with different ones in the two others. ERPs were more positive at all electrode subsets for stimulus pairs that were  inconsistent with the belief than for those that were consistent. In the N400 time window, at frontal electrode sites, ERPs were again more positive for inconsistent than for consistent stimuli. As participants had no way to see the stimulus their partner was presented with and thus no way to detect inconsistence, these data might reveal an impact of the qualia of a person on the brain activity of another. Such impact could provide a research avenue when trying to explain the similarity of qualia across individuals.

The early and preconscious processing of stimuli that are meaningful in everyday life includes systematical activations of many semantic, emotional and motor representations. Inhibitions should then occur in order to select, among these primed representations, those that are consistent with the context. Even in a lab this context is social, as it typically consists of the experimenter and of the instructions and stimuli (s)he provides. Three recent N400 studies confirm this social view of experimental settings by showing that socially driven processes affect what was primed by prior stimuli. The small amplitudes of the N400 event-related potentials (ERPs) elicited by stimuli preceded by semantical primes were found to be enhanced by the mere presence of a person next to participants when they know this person did not have the semantic primes. It thus seems that N400 processes inhibit what these primes have activated so that participants can also have the perspective of the uninformed person. This inhibition interpretation implies that N400s should be notably reduced when nothing allows to determine what should be inhibited, that is, when the social context is not defined and when task’s instructions require minimal inhibition. We tested this prediction by having a stranger next to participants (n=29) and by presenting meaningful unpredictable images in a simple memorization task. As foreseen, N400s were small. They were enhanced by definable social contexts, that is, in participants alone with the experimenter (n=30) and in those with a friend (n = 36). The amplitudes of the N300s were also enhanced. A second experiment revealed that these N300 and N400 enhancements were larger for friends who felt in the presence of their partner during most of the experiment. As to the late posterior positivities (LPPs) immediately succeeding the N400s, they were found to be larger in the unknown social context of the first experiment, suggesting that more information ended up being placed into the working memory when inhibitions could not occur. These results are compatible with a serial 3-stages framework of the processing of stimuli meaningful in everyday life. Early and broad systematic activations (priming) would be followed by automatic late selections done according to the social-context and then, by the participant’s consciousness of the meanings of the stimulus in this context. As inadequate late selections would cause impairments of social and cognitive behaviors, the present results could have implications for psychiatric disorders, such as autism and schizophrenia.