The long-run abnormal returns following both stock repurchases and seasoned equity offerings disappear for the events in 2003–2012. The disappearance is associated with the changing market environment: increased institutional investment, decreased trading costs, improved liquidity, and enhanced regulations on corporate governance and information disclosure. In response to the more efficient pricing of stocks, firms become less opportunistic in stock repurchases and offerings. Recent events of stock repurchases and offerings are motivated more by business-operating reasons than to exploit mispricing. Both external market factors and internal firm factors contribute to the disappearance of the postevent abnormal returns. Our findings on the recent events contrast with those of earlier studies and shed light on how the changing market environment affects both asset pricing and corporate behavior. This paper was accepted by Wei Jiang, finance.

This paper develops and tests a new theoretical explanation for stock repurchases. Investors may disagree with the manager about the firm's investment projects. A repurchase causes a change in the investor base as investors who are most likely to disagree with the manager tender their shares. Therefore, a firm is more likely to buy back shares when the level of investor-management agreement is lower, and agreement improves as a consequence. Moreover, dispersion of opinion among investors cannot explain repurchase activity once the stock price and investor-management agreement are controlled for. Overall, the evidence is consistent with firms strategically using repurchases to improve alignment between management and shareholders. (JEL G30, G35)For helpful comments, we thank Laura Starks (editor), an anonymous referee,

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