Using a novel panel dataset of Egyptian governorates for the period 1992-2007, we investigate the effects of aggregate and sectoral foreign direct investment (FDI) on Egypt's economic growth. We distinguish between FDI in the manufacturing, agriculture and service sector. The similarity of governorates in terms of institutional characteristics like culture, language, and legal framework and the consistency of the data collection process enables an effective estimation of the effect of FDI on Egypt's economic growth. Employing General Methods of Moments (GMM) panel estimations, we find that neither aggregate nor sectoral FDI has an unconditional effect on economic growth. We also reject human capital as a channel of absorptive capacity, but reveal an interesting effect of FDI in the service sector on economic growth in interaction with domestic private investment (DPI). Service FDI promotes economic growth only if the host governorate has a minimum threshold of DPI to absorb foreign knowledge and technology.

No abstract

There is an ongoing debate on the relationship between Islam and (lack of) democracy. Considerable literature shows that Islam, represented as an informal institution by Muslim population share, has a negative effect on democracy. This study examines the effects of formal institutions, specifically constitutions that prescribe Islamic law ( Shari’a) as a source of legislation, on democracy. We use a newly developed coding of the degree to which Islam is incorporated in constitutions. Our empirical results show that the constitutional entrenchment of Islamic law has a negative and significant effect on democracy. Our findings are robust to using different estimators and instrumental variable regressions, employing alternative measures of democracy and controlling for Muslim population, natural resource wealth, and additional control variables. While we show that Islamic constitutionalism is a reason for a democracy deficit in Muslim-majority countries, we find no evidence that Islam is inimical to democracy when not entrenched in the constitution.

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in AbstractThis paper empirically studies the voting outcomes of Egypt's first parliamentary elections after the Arab Spring. In light of the strong Islamist success in the polls, we explore the main determinants of Islamist vs. secular voting. We identify three dimensions that affect voting outcomes at the constituency level: the socio-economic profile, the economic structure and the electoral institutional framework. Our results show that education is negatively associated with Islamist voting. Interestingly, we find significant evidence which suggests that higher poverty levels are associated with a lower vote share for Islamist parties. Later voting stages in the sequential voting setup do not exhibit a bandwagon effect.JEL Codes: D72, D78, O53, P26, Z12, Z13

No abstract