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``Every locality is encouraged to learn from Kunshan to self-develop its own zone. After the zone has grown to some extent, the state will evaluate and then grant`the hat [of national title]' to become a national development zone.'' Li Peng, Prime Minister of China, comment in July 1992 (1) 1 Introduction: locally initiated projects in post-Mao China The tremendous success of China's reform in recent years has undeniably attracted worldwide attention. In many perspectives, post-Mao China can be regarded as having relatively superior economic growth and as having made rapid improvements in living standards at the national scale (World Bank, 1997; 2001). However, as many studies have shown, this transition in China also has been propelled by active and flexible roles played by local agents who have managed to bring about policy and institutional innovations in order to promote economic development (

Territorial economic competition first emerged in North America, appeared in Europe during the 1980s, and recently in many LDC/transition economies chasing FDI. In China the process is key to economic development, but operates without the electoral competition and private land markets which are central in the West. We relate developments in each to a general model whereby local circumstances shape selective coalitions of economic agents, and hence policy mixes, differing in their wastefulness and redistributive effects. In the Chinese case, strong competition (involving much waste) is primarily driven by ambitious local officials seeking promotion by pursuing centrally determined growth targets

China's urban transformation since 1978 is notable for both its scale and speed. Focusing on the dimension of speed, we propose the concept of the ‘urban speed machine’ to assess its role in shaping the politics and political economy of Chinese urbanization. We argue that in China speed must not be understood merely by means of measurable outcomes of change, but rather that speed is an essential and vital element embedded within China's specific processes and mechanisms driving urban growth. In this sense, speed is constantly at the forefront of local cadres’ considerations, since moving fast to achieve urban growth is an expression of political imperatives and pervasive city‐based accumulation strategies. The Chinese urban speed machine, as we conceive it, mainly involves three state‐dominated institutional arenas: the Communist party's personnel review system, the planning mechanism and local finance. We also discuss regional variability vis‐à‐vis the nature of speed in urbanization and in the differing responses to problems of fast‐city growth in recent years. This article's core contributions are to clarify the paramount importance of speed in the political economy of urban growth and illuminate a relational understanding of the politics of speed in China's urban change.

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