We

We study the classic mathematical economics problem of Bayesian optimal mechanism design where a principal aims to optimize expected revenue when allocating resources to self-interested agents with preferences drawn from a known distribution. In single parameter settings (i.e., where each agent's preference is given by a single private value for being served and zero for not being served) this problem is solved [20]. Unfortunately, these single parameter optimal mechanisms are impractical and rarely employed [1], and furthermore the underlying economic theory fails to generalize to the important, relevant, and unsolved multi-dimensional setting (i.e., where each agent's preference is given by multiple values for each of the multiple services available) [25].In contrast to the theory of optimal mechanisms we develop a theory of sequential posted price mechanisms, where agents in sequence are offered take-it-or-leave-it prices. We prove that these mechanisms are approximately optimal in single-dimensional settings. These posted-price mechanisms avoid many of the properties of optimal mechanisms that make the latter impractical. Furthermore, these mechanisms generalize naturally to multi-dimensional settings where they give the first known approximations to the elusive optimal multi-dimensional mechanism design problem. In particular, we solve multi-dimensional multi-unit auction problems and generalizations to matroid feasibility constraints. The constant approximations we obtain range from 1.5 to 8. For all but one case, our posted price sequences can be computed in polynomial time.This work can be viewed as an extension and improvement of the single-agent algorithmic pricing work of [9] to the setting of multiple agents where the designer has combinatorial feasibility constraints on which agents can simultaneously obtain each service.

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Algorithmic pricing is the computational problem that sellers (e.g., in supermarkets) face when trying to set prices for their items to maximize their profit in the presence of a known demand. Guruswami et al. (2005) propose this problem and give logarithmic approximations (in the number of consumers) for the unit-demand and single-parameter cases where there is a specific set of consumers and their valuations for bundles are known precisely. Subsequently several versions of the problem have been shown to have poly-logarithmic inapproximability. This problem has direct ties to the important open question of better understanding the Bayesian optimal mechanism in multi-parameter agent settings; however, for this purpose approximation factors logarithmic in the number of agents are inadequate. It is therefore of vital interest to consider special cases where constant approximations are possible.We consider the unit-demand variant of this pricing problem. Here a consumer has a valuation for each different item and their value for a set of items is simply the maximum value they have for any item in the set. Instead of considering a set of consumers with precisely known preferences, like the prior algorithmic pricing literature, we assume that the preferences of the consumers are drawn from a distribution. This is the standard assumption in economics; furthermore, the setting of a specific set of customers with specific preferences, which is employed in all of the prior work in algorithmic pricing, is a special case of this general Bayesian pricing problem, where there is a discrete Bayesian distribution for preferences specified by picking one consumer uniformly from the given set of consumers. Notice that the distribution over the valuations for the individual items that this generates is obviously correlated. Our work complements these existing works by considering the case where the consumer's valuations for the different items are independent random variables. Our main result is a constant approximation algorithm for this problem that makes use of an interesting connection between this problem and the concept of virtual valuations from the single-parameter Bayesian optimal mechanism design literature.

Given a metric space G on n nodes, with a start node r and deadlines D(v) for each vertex v, we consider the Deadline-TSP problem of finding a path starting at r that visits as many nodes as possible by their deadlines. We also consider the more general Vehicle Routing with TimeWindows problem, in which each node v also has a releasetime R(v) and the goal is to visit as many nodes as possible within their "time-windows" [R(v), D(v)]. No good approximations were known previously for these problems on general metric spaces. We give an O(log n) approximation algorithm for Deadline-TSP, and extend this algorithm to an O(log 2 n) approximation for the Time-Window problem. We also give a bicriteria approximation algorithm for both problems: Given an > 0, our algorithm produces a log(1/ ) approximation, while exceeding the deadlines by a factor of 1 + . We use as a subroutine for these results a constantfactor approximation that we develop for a generalization of the orienteering problem in which both the start and the end nodes of the path are fixed. In the process, we give a 3-approximation to the orienteering problem, improving on the previously best known 4-approximation of [6].