Abstract.  Budgeting can be understood as a common resource pool problem where spending agencies have incentives to encourage excessive levels of current spending and reduce budget surplus or create budget deficits. The political leadership is assumed to have an important role in keeping fiscal control and resisting the high‐demanders’ pressure for increased spending. Three factors of relevance for their success are investigated: political characteristics (political colour and political strength, the strength of relevant interest groups) and two institutional characteristics– committee structure and budgeting procedures. The analyses are based on panel data from up to 434 Norwegian municipalities in the period from 1991 to 1998. The results support the hypothesis that strong political leadership improves fiscal performance. The effect of interest groups is to a high degree community‐specific. However, an increased share of elderly reduces fiscal surplus. Differences in budgetary procedures do not seem to affect fiscal performance. A strong committee structure seems, on the other hand, to result in better fiscal performance than a weaker one.

This study of municipal e‐participation in Norway, comprising local politicians as well as citizens, explores the impact of municipal size on online participation. First, the analyses show that the conventional predictors of offline participation also influence online participation, but the Internet encourages more activity among young people. Second, the same digital divides are generally found within the local political elite as among the citizens. Municipal size is, however, an exception. In the case of the local politicians, higher online participation rates are found in populous municipalities. This territorial digital divide is absent among the citizens. The findings indicate that the relatively high level of traditional participation in small municipalities also promote e‐participation.

Inspired by the concept of New Public Management, recent organisational alterations in Norwegian local councils have aimed to change the role of local politicians from a traditional to a strategic political one. Traditionally, local politicians have been involved in the day-to-day activities of the council, and have tended to address single issues and details. Strategic leadership implies, however, a withdrawal from close contact with the service departments and a primary focus on (preferably pivotal) issues of a general and/or principle nature, such as budgeting, goal setting, and planning. In addition, establishment of stronger coordinating bodies is emphasised. Drawing on evidence from a large body of research, it is concluded that so far, for the ordinary local politician, the new role is rather puzzling, that is, confusing and perplexing, thus creating a certain sense of uneasiness. Two theoretical reasons for this state of a¡airs are presented. First, it is demonstrated that some of the chosen organisational solutions simply cannot be assumed to work as intended. Second, it is argued that the concept of strategic political leadership represents such a challenge to the local politicians' traditional behaviour that a certain amount of reluctance and prevarication is to be expected. The article concludes with a discussion of why the changes have taken place in several municipalities, despite the demonstrable weaknesses in the basic idea. One suggested reason is the improvements to the working conditions of the political and administrative elite as a result of the changes.

The last 30 years of the New Public Management 'regime' in many western countries have resulted in increased use of audit and other control mechanisms. These mechanisms are supposed to contribute both to accountability and improvement. In this article, theories of evaluation and organizational learning are used to understand how the dynamics of control affect change processes. We analyse responses to performance audit reports carried out by the country's Supreme Audit Institution-an important control institution in Norway, as in most other countries. The findings are primarily based on survey data from 353 Norwegian civil servants. The auditees reported that they were mostly positive towards the reports and used them to make improvements in their control systems; however, civil servants also perceived the reports to be unbalanced. The results indicate that the performance audits' contributions to improvements are less clear than they appear to be at first glance, and that personal and political factors may affect civil servants' responses.

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